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INTRODUCTION
Antidumping is one of the most controversial issues in the field of
international trade.1 It divides the main exporting countries from the
main importing countries. Companies and industries that find
themselves slipping in the international market often abuse
antidumping measures for protectionist purposes.2
Antidumping investigations exact a tremendous cost on the
company being investigated and deter other foreign companies from
entering the market, often allowing the domestic competitor to gain
the upper hand.3 The difficulty involved in enforcing antidumping
regulation is compounded by the fact that both private companies
and government actors are involved. Thus far, negotiations on
antidumping laws at the international level have been filled with
1. The controversy surrounding antidumping is demonstrated by the strong views it
engenders. See Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millenium: The Ascendancy of
Antidumping Measures, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49, 53 (1997) (“There is . . . one significant
threat to the sanguine prospects for freer international trade—antidumping action.”); see also
Dale E. McNiel, United States’ Agricultural Protectionism After the Uruguay Round, 23 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 281, 298 (1998) (characterizing antidumping duty law as perhaps the “most
controversial” in trade law).
2. See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND 81 (1995) (describing antidumping action as “an unfair means of preventing
fair competition”); see also infra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
3. See GREG MASTEL, AMERICAN TRADE LAWS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 88 (1996)
(“Even if unsuccessful, anti-dumping cases all too often involve[] trade disruption and heavy
legal costs.”); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND THE
GATT: AN EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFIED REMEDY FOR UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 2 (1987) (criticizing the use of antidumping measures by domestic industries to create
an unfair bargaining situation); Corr, supra note 1, at 54-55 (describing antidumping measures
in the United States as “a profoundly effective weapon” because U.S. success in pursuing
antidumping cases discourages foreign competitors from entering the U.S. market when there
is even a remote possibility of an antidumping complaint against them).

tension4 and have produced standards that are often vague and
ineffective.5
Dumping is the practice of selling a good in a foreign country for
less than “normal” or “fair” value, which is usually defined as the
price at which the product is sold in the domestic market.6 Dumping
is considered an act of unfair trade because it puts the players in the
domestic market at a disadvantage.7 Governments counter such
action through antidumping laws, which allow them to pursue a
petition made by a domestic company (the petitioner), launch an
investigation, and levy antidumping duties upon the foreign company
(the respondent) if they find that dumping has caused or threatened
material injury to the domestic industry.8 However, the investigations
that may or may not result in a finding of dumping are often
themselves protectionist acts of unfair trade.9 The investigations have
a detrimental impact on the targeted companies10 and also deter
other companies from trading in that market.11 Both of these effects
4. See infra Part I.C (demonstrating the contention surrounding the development of
antidumping regulations in the GATT/WTO).
5. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that international antidumping and
countervailing duty laws have been flawed for the following reasons: lack of discretion in price
discrimination disputes, abuse and misuse of the laws, lengthy time commitments affecting a
small amount of trade, procedurally and substantively complicated provisions and international
inconsistencies); infra Part I.C (describing how some of the standards that the international
community has reached have been vague and ineffective).
6. See PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 247 (3d ed. 1994). For a discussion
of “domestic price,” see Patrick A. Messerlin, The Uruguay Negotiations on Antidumping
Enforcement: Some Basic Issues, in POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES 45, 46-50
(P.K.M. Tharakan ed., Advanced Series in Management No. 14, 1991) [hereinafter POLICY
IMPLICATIONS].
7. Governments and industries in importing countries fear that the inundation of
cheaper imports will harm and possibly wipe out their domestic industries. See Keith Steele, An
Introductory Overview, in ANTI-DUMPING UNDER THE WTO: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 1, 2 (Keith
Steele ed., 1996) [hereinafter ANTI-DUMPING UNDER THE WTO].
8. See Corr, supra note 1, at 77-78 (outlining the initiation and investigation process).
9. See J. Michael Finger, Antidumping Is Where the Action Is, in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT
WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT 3, 3 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993) [hereinafter ANTIDUMPING:
HOW IT WORKS] (arguing that petitioners will file numerous unjustified petitions in the hope
that their governments will levy a duty upon a foreign competitor, thus giving the petitioner an
unfair advantage in the market). But see Terence P. Stewart, Administration of the Antidumping
Law: A Different Perspective, in DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE
LAWS 288, 293 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) [hereinafter DOWN IN THE
DUMPS] (describing the harm that dumping can cause to companies and claiming that U.S.
antidumping law attempts to encourage “the workings of comparative advantage”).
10. See Corr, supra note 1, at 53 (describing antidumping petitions as an “effective weapon”
that places a heavy burden on competitors). This is true in terms of the money a company must
spend to comply with the lengthy and detailed questionnaires of the investigating government,
the potential productivity lost during an investigation and the possible exposure of confidential
information regarding price and cost. See MASTEL, supra note 3, at 88 (arguing that the filing of
antidumping investigations can be used to harass a foreign competitor because of the expense
involved in defending an allegation and complying with an investigation).
11. See MASTEL, supra note 3, at 88 (claiming that a dumping allegation is expensive to
both prove and defend against). The same logic that explains how the filing of an investigation

thus reduce the competition faced by the domestic industry.
The potential for governments to invoke antidumping laws
abusively has created controversy over the level of evidence required
to initiate an investigation.12 Opinions on this issue vary drastically
among nations, based in large part upon whether the country is a
main exporting or importing country. Many exporting companies
argue that the level of evidence required should be high to guard
against the use of investigations as a weapon to restrict exports.13 In
contrast, many of the importing countries argue that investigations
prevent unfair competition and advocate a more flexible evidentiary
requirement.14
Another factor in this debate is the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), which is the foremost entity in international trade.15 The
WTO structure builds upon that of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”) and includes guidelines for the initiation and
execution of antidumping investigations, as well as the imposition of
sanctions upon positive findings.16 One complication that has arisen
may be used to harass a competitor can be applied to show how the potential threat of having to
defend against such costs may dissuade a foreign company from entering the market in the first
place. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
12. There are two related issues that are part of the threshold for initiation: standing and
the evidentiary burden. While many authorities use the terms interchangeably, they have
different foci. In this context, “standing” refers to the “right of a party or parties in the
importing country to petition for relief under national antidumping laws.” 2 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1575 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993)
[hereinafter NEGOTIATING HISTORY]; see also Ronald A. Cass & Stephen J. Narkin, Antidumping
Duty and Countervailing Duty Law: The United States and the GATT, in DOWN IN THE DUMPS, supra
note 9, at 200, 229 (defining “standing” in this context as “the standards that the government
uses in determining who is entitled to initiate and prosecute an antidumping investigation”).
The evidentiary burden issue, on the other hand, focuses on the amount and type of
evidence that must be set out in a petition. This Comment examines the evidentiary burden
that is required and the one that should be required. It also discusses the issue of standing, as a
related issue that has been very controversial.
13. See 2 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1581 (explaining the exporter countries’
recommendations on this issue). This camp includes Japan, Hong Kong, the Nordic countries
(Sweden, Norway and Finland) and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”). See id.
14. Australia, the United States, Canada and the European Union (“EU”) are among the
countries in this category. See Steele, supra note 7, at 2-3. Not coincidentally, these four entities
have brought more than 90% of the antidumping and countervailing duty actions within the
GATT since 1979. See id.
15. See id. at 1 (recounting the switch from the GATT to the WTO regime and noting the
expansion of trade policies that accompanied this shift). This Comment generally uses the
term “GATT” to refer to the pre-1994 laws and system, as well as the GATT 1994 Agreement; it
uses the term “WTO” to refer to the post-1994 system.
16. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; Agreement
on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter WTO Antidumping Code],

is the interplay between these antidumping guidelines and those in
place in the individual member nations.17 This Comment contrasts
these procedures, particularly those relating to the initiation of an
antidumping investigation under the rules of the WTO and those of
the United States. This Comment also analyzes the impact that the
initiation threshold has on antidumping investigations.
Determining the appropriate evidentiary threshold is a significant
issue. A threshold that is too low will encourage unwarranted
complaints and investigations, which will in turn result in
protectionism and deter international trade and investment.18 A
threshold that is too high will lead to increased and unchecked
dumping and other unfair trade practices.19 The need to find a
balance between these two extremes is the crux of the problem and
one of the foci of this Comment.
The threshold issue is important for many reasons. First, it has
been a source of contention since the first GATT Antidumping
Code.20 Both the major trading countries and the developing
countries employ antidumping investigations more frequently today.21
As a result, the issue of whether a petitioner has provided sufficient
evidence to initiate an investigation is likely to arise more frequently.
reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
174 (3d ed. Supp. 1995).
17. See Steele, supra note 7, at 2 (suggesting that the WTO Antidumping Code should be
“understood as part of the political balancing between the trade liberalization objectives of the
GATT, now the WTO, on the one hand, and member countries’ concerns that their domestic
industries can compete on ‘a level playing field’ on the other”). Steele portrays the distinction
as reflecting different approaches to competition adopted at the supranational WTO level and
at the national level. See id.
18. See Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 56 (1995)
(“A protectionist abuser benefits from an overly broad standing requirement.”).
19. See id. (“[T]he meritorious petitioner is harmed by a standing requirement that is too
strict.”); Linda M. Weinberg, Comment, On Whose Behalf? Underlying Conflicts of the Antidumping
Standing Rules, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 573, 574 (1987) (discussing how stringent standing
requirements have a “discouraging” effect on individual firms).
20. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S.
6431, 650 U.N.T.S. 320 [hereinafter GATT 1967 Antidumping Code]. For a discussion of the
controversy surrounding this issue leading up to the first GATT antidumping code, see infra
notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing the development of antidumping regulation
under the GATT prior to the Uruguay Round).
21. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
672 (3d ed. 1995) (citing GATT statistics indicating that a growing number of countries are
using antidumping laws); Finger, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that “[t]he emergence of unfair
trade rules as a major instrument for regulating imports has not gone unnoticed by the
developing countries,” and noting that over 30 developing countries had become signatories to,
or observers of, the then-optional GATT antidumping and countervailing duty laws by the end
of the 1980s). Countries that have recently enacted antidumping laws and begun to utilize
them include New Zealand, Mexico, South Africa, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. See Steele,
supra note 7, at 3 (suggesting that the increase in the use of antidumping laws by these
countries is, at least in part, a response to the prevalence of such use by the United States,
Canada, Australia and the European Union throughout the 1980s).

This issue has already arisen at the GATT/WTO level on two
occasions discussed in more detail later in this Comment.22
Second, governments are under increasing pressure to make their
domestic regulations conform with the WTO regulations.23 This
pressure is in large part due to the more serious sanctions available to
WTO dispute resolution panels than existed under the GATT.24 As a
result, countries have sought to reduce the risk of being found in
violation of the WTO regime.25
Third, the debate over the appropriate threshold for initiating an
investigation and its resolution will have an impact on the WTO itself.
The threshold issue may very well be one of the most divisive and
politically-charged issues yet faced by the new organization.
Consequently, many supporters and critics are eager to see how the
WTO will withstand this challenge.
This Comment begins by providing background information on
the components of the issue of an evidentiary threshold; it will
describe the GATT and the WTO, antidumping measures, and the
threshold required to initiate an antidumping investigation. Part II
focuses on antidumping regulation in the United States, both
generally and specifically with respect to the initiation of
investigations. Part III examines two GATT/WTO cases that have
addressed the evidentiary threshold required for the initiation of an
antidumping investigation. Part IV analyzes the issue of a threshold
evidentiary requirement, evaluating the status quo and the effect of
Portland Cement, and arguing that the WTO should raise the
evidentiary threshold and clearly articulate this standard. The final
22. See Guatemala Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement From Mexico,
WT/DS60/R (June 19, 1998) [hereinafter Portland Cement Panel Report]; United States—
Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, Oct. 27-28, 1993, GATT B.I.S.D.
(40th Supp.), at 358 (1995) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber Panel Report]; see also infra Part III
(discussing the treatment of the evidentiary requirement in relation to two cases before
GATT/WTO dispute resolution panels). The Appellate Body has since concluded that the
Portland Cement matter was not properly before the Panel. See Guatemala Anti-Dumping
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement From Mexico, WT/DS69/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998), para.
88 [hereinafter Portland Cement Appellate Body Report]; discussion infra Part III.B.
23. Although WTO Members are theoretically required to have their domestic laws comply
with the WTO, this has not been the practice. See infra notes 139-43 (discussing U.S.
noncompliance with a GATT requirement regarding verification of industry support and the
subsequent challenge by Sweden).
24. See discussion infra Part I.D (reviewing the dispute settlement procedures under the
GATT and the WTO).
25. See John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO: Significance &
Challenges, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 5, 15 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996)
[hereinafter MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK] (explaining why WTO members are under
increasing pressure to conform to WTO rules); see also infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text
(discussing the implications of stricter sanctions under the WTO).

section concludes that, as an organization, the WTO has a
responsibility to take such measures.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON DUMPING AND THE GATT/WTO
A. A Brief History of the GATT and Its Transformation to the WTO

The GATT26 was the principal multilateral treaty for international
trade from its inception in 1947 until the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round in 1994.27 During this period, the participating countries used
the GATT framework as a mechanism to negotiate trade
concessions.28 Although the GATT in many ways functioned beyond
its intended scope and purpose, its creators intended the GATT to
serve only as a provisional measure, assuming it would be supplanted
by the International Trade Organization (“ITO”).29
The GATT has evolved through eight major multilateral
negotiation rounds on trade liberalization,30 many of which also led
26. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
27. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 289 (emphasizing how influential the GATT was,
despite its provisional nature). The treaty comprises over 200 agreements and protocols. See id.
at 296.
28. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
17 (Midway reprint 1977) (describing the GATT’s primary significance as providing the
framework for major tariff negotiation conferences). A tariff is a duty imposed by a
government on imported goods. See CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., TRADE PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 37 (1995) (defining the term as “a form of excise tax”). In the context of the
GATT, a concession is a lowering of an import barrier. See BRUCE E. MOON, DILEMMAS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 78 (1996).
29. See DAM, supra note 28, at 11 (describing the GATT as “in origin a trade agreement
designed to record the results of a tariff conference that was envisioned at the time as being the
first of a number of such conferences to be conducted under the auspices of the ITO”). Many
critics, however, saw the ITO as a violation of national sovereignty. When the United States
failed to approve the charter for the ITO, the GATT became the default international trade
entity. See id.; cf. MOON, supra note 28, at 77 (stating that, while the GATT was forced to assume
a larger role than originally intended, its principal activity remained the facilitation of trade
negotiation rounds).
The GATT was amended to include most of the commercial policy of the ITO Charter but
practically none of its procedural and institutional provisions. See DAM, supra note 28, at 21.
The non-substantive provisions “are largely limited to [those] that were thought necessary in
1948 for the General Agreement to function as a continuing multilateral agreement, and do
not include ones that might have been inserted if it had been contemplated that the General
Agreement would become the founding document of an international organization.” Id. The
GATT also lacked an institutionalized dispute settlement procedure. See Robert E. Hudec, The
Role of the GATT Secretariat in the Evolution of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND BEYOND 101, 102 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998) (describing how
the GATT was imbued with a modest dispute settlement procedure because the GATT was
intended to stand alone only from 1947 until 1948 or 1949, when the ITO was supposed to
enter into force); cf. infra Part I.D (describing the WTO system).
30. Round one took place in Geneva, Switzerland in 1947; round two took place in
Annecy, France in 1948; and Torquay, England was the site of round three in 1950. The next
three rounds took place in Geneva: round four in 1956, the Dillon Round from 1960 to 1961,

to the creation of side agreements on various issues.31 The early
rounds were concerned with tariffs, which were the major trade
barriers of the time.32 As the rounds succeeded in essentially
extinguishing the tariff problem, the focus shifted to non-tariff
barriers such as antidumping.33 Most recently, the Uruguay Round
expanded the scope of trade negotiations and the resulting
agreements to cover services and intellectual property, as well as
goods.34
The Uruguay Round was “the longest and most difficult bargaining
in GATT history.”35 Although not the intended purpose of the
round,36 the participants in the Uruguay Round, numbering over one
the Kennedy Round from 1964 to 1968, and the Tokyo Round from 1973 to 1979. The
Uruguay Round lasted the longest of any round, from 1986 to 1994, and took place in multiple
locations including Uruguay and Marrakesh, Morocco. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at
314. The number of GATT signatories has grown steadily, from 23 at the 1947 Geneva
Convention to 96 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 (with 28 countries in the
process of negotiating accession). See MOON, supra note 28, at 77. Currently, there are 134
WTO Members and 30 countries in the process of negotiating accession. See WTO, About the
WTO (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/accessions.htm>.
31. Under the provisions of the GATT 1947, a supermajority was required to amend the
treaty and, even then, only those parties that agreed to the change would be bound by it. See
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 51 (4th ed. 1991) (citation omitted). Because of the difficulty in
achieving such solidarity, many issues were decided through side agreements, also called
“codes” and “understandings.” See id. at 52-56. Side agreements bound only their signatories, a
process which facilitated the creation of such agreements but simultaneously limited their
effect. See id. at 56. The Antidumping Code prior to the Uruguay Round is an example of such
a side agreement. The 1967 Kennedy Round Antidumping Code had 17 signatories, while the
1979 Tokyo Round Code had 23. See EDWIN A. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 5 (1987). One of the most remarkable
aspects of the WTO Agreement is that it incorporated all of the side agreements into GATT
1994. See JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 15 (1994) (labeling this
incorporation the “single undertaking”). As a result, all WTO members are bound by the
former side agreements. See id. (stating that many countries which formerly “enjoyed a free
ride” in these areas would now have to undertake the new obligations).
32. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 52.
33. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 376 (outlining various import restrictions);
ROWLEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 205 (describing the push at the Kennedy Round for
international legislation to minimize the use of non-tariff barriers). A non-tariff barrier is a
measure other than a tariff through which countries restrain imports. Other non-tariff barriers
include quotas and subsidies. This shift began to occur with the Kennedy Round. See id.
34. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS Agreement].
35. MOON, supra note 28, at 86. Factors complicating the political situation during the
Uruguay Round included: the divergent trade interests of the West and East that were exposed
at the end of the Cold War; the shift in power from the developed, western states to the
developing countries; and the focus on domestic economic performance resulting from the
slowdown in worldwide growth. See id.
36. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 301 (“[T]here was no indication during the 1980s
and during the preparations for the Uruguay Round negotiations that there would be a

hundred, succeeded in passing the 22,000-page Marrakesh
Agreement that created the WTO.37
The WTO, which entered into force on January 1, 1995, has the
authority to enforce the GATT and the other trade agreements that
are now part of the WTO Agreement.38 In fact, the GATT continues
to serve as the treaty source for most of the WTO’s substantive
norms.39 The WTO Agreement consists of the WTO Charter and a
number of annexes containing GATT 1994, the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (“GATS”), the General Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (“TPRM”), and four plurilateral agreements that are
binding only on those countries who have agreed to them.40 GATT
1994 is itself a comprehensive agreement representing GATT 1947 as
it has been amended through the trade liberalization rounds and
including the previously optional side agreements.41
As an
international organization, the WTO has attributes such as a
secretariat, budget, and the ability to conduct relations with other
international entities.42 The participating states are “Members,”
rather than “Contracting Parties” as they were in GATT 1947.43
It is universally accepted that the Members of the WTO must still
resolve many issues.44 It is currently a matter of debate, however,
whether a ninth round of trade negotiations, referred to as the
proposal for a new organization during the Round.”).
37. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement].
38. See id. art. III.2 (“The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and
operation, and further the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements . . . .”).
39. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 290 (discussing the GATT as the predecessor to
the WTO as well as the existing treaty source for substantive norms).
40. See WTO Agreement, supra note 37.
41. See id.; see also M.A.G. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 102
(7th ed. 1998) (“GATT lives on as GATT 1994, the amended and updated version of GATT
1947, which is an integral part of the WTO Agreement.”); supra note 31 and accompanying text
(explaining the development of side agreements prior to the Uruguay Round).
42. See The Official Web page of the World Trade Organization (visited Feb. 4, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org> (providing a fact file which includes information about the secretariat
and budget); see also SCHOTT, supra note 31, at 137 (evaluating the functions and
responsibilities of the WTO Secretariat).
43. See WTO Agreement, supra note 37; GATT 1947, supra note 26; G.J. LANJOUW,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE INSTITUTIONS 6 (ACE Translations trans., 1995).
44. The Marrakesh Agreement contains a timetable for future negotiations on unfinished
business, the review of current provisions and negotiations on new issues. See SCHOTT, supra
note 31, at 34. Antidumping is one of these areas. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 318.
Other areas include financial services, movement of natural persons, research and development
subsidies, government procurement of services and agriculture. See SCHOTT, supra note 31, at
33-36.

“Millennium Round,” should take place in the year 2000.45
B. Dumping and Antidumping Measures
1.

Dumping and the GATT/WTO
According to conventional thought, dumping constitutes a form of
unfair trade and predatory pricing.46 Although the GATT does not
prohibit dumping,47 it does allow countries to impose antidumping
45. European Union members, Australia and Japan are among the states pushing for the
Millennium Round. The United States originally resisted the idea, arguing that rounds are no
longer necessary; that negotiations have become routine; and that a piecemeal, sector-by-sector
approach to resolving the remaining issues is more appropriate. See Trade Leaders Celebrate 50
Years of Open Market Efforts, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, CURNWS File (mentioning that President Clinton’s speech calling for a faster system
of international trade negotiations set him at odds with the European Union and Japan); U.S.’
Barshefsky-3, AFX NEWS, Oct. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File
(describing U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky’s explanation of U.S. objections to a
new round as two-fold: (1) in a trade round, there is no agreement until there is an agreement
on every issue, and (2) there is no time limit). During President Clinton’s State of the Union
address on Jan. 19, 1999, however, he called for the initiation of a new round. See U.S. Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Remarks on the President’s State of the Union Address
Regarding the Upcoming WTO Ministerial (Jan. 20, 1999), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File.
46. See KENEN, supra note 6, at 247 (“A prohibition against dumping . . . was included in
the GATT because dumping is often viewed as a predatory practice.”); MASTEL, supra note 3, at
76 (explaining that proponents of antidumping laws assert that “dumping is the result of
predatory foreign firms’ efforts to drive U.S. competitors out of business in order to gain
control of the market and raise prices”). Predatory pricing refers to the intent on the part of a
company to sell its product so cheaply that its competitors will be forced out of business. See
Brian Hindley, The Economics of Dumping and Anti-Dumping Action: Is There a Baby in the
Bathwater?, in POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 27.
There is a strong counterargument to this theory on dumping, however.
Some
commentators argue that smart domestic business practices are unjustly labeled unfair when
applied to international markets:
Dumping, when it actually exists, is merely an exercise in price discrimination, selling
the same product in different markets at different prices, which is rational economic
behavior. It is a policy that, when properly followed, maximizes a company’s profits.
Yet when it is done across national borders, it is considered sinister or evil.
Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 491, 553
(1993); see also Steele, supra note 7, at 2 (presenting the claim of many economists that
dumping is in the interest of the consumer in the importing country unless it is both predatory
and there is a serious prospect that the dumper will become a monopoly); see also Hindley,
supra, at 28-30 (pointing out that, although examples of predatory pricing do exist, “the great
bulk of actual antidumping cases cannot conceivably be explained in terms of predatory
pricing” and arguing that, if predatory pricing is the genuine rationale for antidumping action,
such action should only take place in situations where predatory pricing is conceivable);
McGee, supra, at 540 (“[P]redatory pricing either does not exist because such behavior is
irrational or, if it does exist, it has usually . . . failed when tried.” (citations omitted)).
47. See Marie Louise Hurabiell, Protectionism Versus Free Trade: Implementing the GATT
Antidumping Agreement in the United States, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 567, 571-72 (1995)
(suggesting that negotiators have perhaps feared that a restriction on dumping would harm
domestic exporters as well as domestic consumers). Furthermore, such a restriction would have
limited effect because it is companies, not governments, that dump. Negotiating parties could
not promise that private companies in their countries would not dump.
Some would say that it is only antidumping measures that are antithetical to the goals of the

duties on foreign companies that dump.48 The GATT states that the
purpose of national antidumping laws is to serve as defense
mechanisms for countries in which dumping has either caused or
threatened injury, or materially “retard[ed] the establishment of a
domestic industry.”49
2.

National antidumping investigations
The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“WTO Antidumping
Code” or “Antidumping Agreement”) sets forth the overall protocol
for investigations, but Members tailor investigations in their
individual countries.50
The procedure for antidumping
investigations, therefore, varies considerably among different
Members.51 The general process is as described below. Investigations
GATT. See P.K.M. Tharakan, Some Facets of Antidumping Policy, in POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra
note 6, at 1 (positing that increased recourse to antidumping mechanisms has resulted in a
contravention of the fundamental principles of GATT—free trade and multilateralism);
Hurabiell, supra, at 572-73 (characterizing the antidumping provision as an exception to the
GATT that “allow[s] certain measures that would otherwise be a violation of [the] GATT”
(citation omitted)).
48. GATT 1994, supra note 16, art. VI; WTO Antidumping Code, supra note 16.
49. See GATT 1994, supra note 16, art. VI.1 (“The contracting parties recognize that
dumping . . . is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established
industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a
domestic industry.”). According to this view, preserving the openness of the market, not
restricting foreign access, is the primary purpose of antidumping procedures. See Stewart, supra
note 9, at 288 (stating that antidumping laws are designed, among other purposes, to “offset
any artificial advantage that flows from closed foreign markets, cross-subsidization by
multiproduct producers, government largesse or other factors that have nothing to do with
comparative advantage”). For other views on the purpose of antidumping measures, see
CROOME, supra note 2, at 81 (describing the view that antidumping action is the way in which
domestic producers discourage imports when they are unable to compete); SCHOTT, supra note
31, at 34 (describing the manipulation of antidumping statutes to promote anticompetitive
conditions in the domestic market); McGee, supra note 46, at 491 (“Antidumping laws were
designed to protect domestic industry from foreign competition.”).
50. See Steele, supra note 7, at 6 (asserting that countries procedurally and substantively
alter the application of the Code so that genuine compliance with the Code is sometimes
questionable); S. Linn Williams, Introduction: Anti-Dumping Laws, Remedies, Procedural Safeguards,
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in the United States, in INSTITUTE OF INT’L BUS. LAW AND
PRACTICE, DUMPING: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 9, 17 (1995) [hereinafter DUMPING: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH] (claiming that, although the GATT establishes basic standards of
transparency and fairness, the national rules establish virtually all the substance and the process
of antidumping law).
The sufficiency of evidence needed to initiate investigations is one of the most important
differences among national laws. See Williams, supra, at 19; infra Part II.B (describing U.S.
threshold requirements). Standing is another area in which standards vary dramatically among
nations. The EU requires that the petition represent 40% of the domestic industry; Canada
requires close to that level; and Mexico and the United States require 25%. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671a(c)(4)(A)(1) (setting forth the U.S. requirement); Williams, supra, at 30 (discussing
European Union, Canadian, Mexican and United States requirements). Also, the governments
in both the EU and Canada verify the claimed industry support. See id.
51. For a description of the process in the United States, see infra Part II.A. For a
discussion of processes in other countries, see generally DUMPING: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH,

are initiated by national governments at the request of one or more
companies in the domestic industry that believe they have been
injured by the dumping actions of a foreign competitor;52 less
frequently, a national agency will initiate an investigation itself
although no petition has been filed.53 The investigating body will
evaluate the evidence presented in the petition and make a
preliminary determination as to whether there is dumping, whether
the domestic industry has been injured, and whether the dumping
was a material cause of the injury.54 Thereafter, it will send
questionnaires to other companies in the domestic industry
regarding injury and to the foreign company accused of dumping
regarding costs and pricing.55 The questionnaire directed at the
foreign company is extremely burdensome, requiring the alleged
dumper to respond within a specified amount of time and submit
large quantities of documents to verify its figures.56
If the
investigating body reaches a final determination that the foreign
company has engaged in dumping, that the domestic industry has
been materially injured, and that the dumping caused the injury, the
body will impose a duty on the offending company.57
C. The Origins and Development of Antidumping Regulation
Dumping was already considered a problematic trade practice in
the second half of the nineteenth century.58 In 1902, the anger of ten
supra note 50; CLIVE STANBROOK & PHILIP BENTLEY, DUMPING AND SUBSIDIES: THE LAW AND
PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE IMPOSITION OF ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1996) (describing the process in the EU); VERMULST, supra note
31 (describing the process in the EU); Craig R. Giesze, Mexico’s New Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty System: Policy and Legal Implications, As Well As Practical Business Risks and
Realities, for United States Exporters to Mexico in the Area of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 25
ST. MARY’S L.J. 885 (1994) (describing the process in Mexico); Steele, supra note 7 (describing
the process in Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and
Taiwan).
52. See Corr, supra note 1, at 77 (noting that an antidumping action begins when a national
authority accepts a petition submitted by the domestic industry alleging harm from dumped
goods).
53. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (1994) (allowing the United States to initiate an
antidumping investigation without receipt of a petition from a domestic industry); see also
Bhala, supra note 18, at 26 (stating that the U.S. Department of Commerce can initiate an
antidumping action, although companies generally do).
54. See Corr, supra note 1, at 77 (outlining the initiation and investigation procedure).
55. See id. at 78 (adding that the national authority may use auditors as another means of
gathering information after it receives the questionnaire responses).
56. See David Rushford, Antitrust Versus Antidumping: Revisiting the Antidumping Act of 1916,
3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 85, 96-98 (1997) (recounting the burden questionnaires
impose upon respondents and criticizing the questionnaire process for its rigid procedural
rules and time constraints).
57. See Corr, supra note 1, at 78 (comparing the U.S. retroactive method of assessing
antidumping duties with the more common prospective system).
58. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 684 (noting that several European countries

European countries over the dumping of sugar led them to sign an
antidumping agreement that would remain in place for eighteen
years.59 Countries unilaterally began to legislate against dumping at
this time.60
When the GATT negotiations began in 1947, the United States
offered its national antidumping law61 as a model, and the negotiating
parties drafted Article VI of the GATT the following year.62 Article VI
defined dumping63 and also established that, upon a finding of both
dumping and injury, a country could impose a duty on the company
or industry in violation in an amount not greater than the dumping
margin.64 The lack of specificity in the agreement quickly became
apparent, however, and led eighteen GATT contracting parties to
supplement the GATT in 1967 with the Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VI.65 Participating countries eventually
incorporated this agreement into the GATT through the Tokyo
Round Code.66 The Tokyo Round Code provided further detail on
including Great Britain and the Netherlands expressed early concern over dumping).
59. See id.
60. See id. (stating that nations, by enacting such legislation, were responding to the
perceived threat of predatory behavior from their trading partners). Canada was the first
country to enact an antidumping law, which it did in 1904. See J. Michael Finger, The Origins
and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation, in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS, supra note 9, at 13,
14-15. The United States followed suit in 1921, patterning the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14,
42 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1994)), after the Canadian provision. See
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTY ORDERS AND SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS 2-1 (1995) [hereinafter U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N]. Interestingly, fears that the laws would be misused for protectionist purposes existed
from the beginning. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 684 (explaining that, by the 1920s,
nations were as concerned about each other’s antidumping laws as they were about the actual
practice of dumping).
61. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 16711677j (1994)).
62. See GATT 1947, supra note 26, art. VI.
63. See id. art. VI.2.
64. See id.; see also CROOME, supra note 2, at 80. A dumping margin is the difference
between the price the exporting country charged and the normal value. See JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 700 (commenting on the complications of finding the export price and the
normal value in order to determine the dumping margin).
65. See GATT 1967 Antidumping Code, supra note 20; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note
21, at 684 (noting that Article VI set “minimal procedural standards” for GATT members to
follow in antidumping cases). The Agreement, which was created to clarify and supplement
Article VI, required that the alleged dumping be the principal cause of the material injury to
the domestic industry. See GATT 1967 Antidumping Code, supra note 20, art. 3 (requiring that
the dumped imports be “demonstrably the principal cause of material injury”).
66. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 685. The signatories of the 1979 Antidumping
Code were limited in large part to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) countries. See Petros C. Mavroidis, Preface to ANTI-DUMPING UNDER
THE WTO, supra note 7, at xxi, xxi.
Following the Tokyo Round, antidumping became the most frequently-used protectionist
instrument. See id. The principal importers, in particular, used antidumping proceedings far
more often than safeguards, countervailing duties, or voluntary export restraints. See id.
(naming the United States, Australia, Canada and the European Community). This may have

how governments could establish dumping and injury;67 set out
questions that assisted in dumping and injury determinations;68
codified the procedure for initiating and conducting an
investigation,69 including when and how an investigation should be
terminated;70 and determined the level and duration of the
application of duties.71
Antidumping was one of the most contentious issues during the
Uruguay Round.72 Agreement on antidumping was reached only at
the very end of the round.73 The United States, the European Union,
Canada and Australia were concerned about attempts to circumvent
antidumping duties; consequently, they sought the inclusion of
certain anti-circumvention procedural devices in the agreement.74
The countries also wanted to expand the discretion of nations
investigating dumping claims.75 Conversely, many of the countries
most commonly targeted with antidumping claims wanted to enact
substantive changes that would impede the use of antidumping laws
been due, at least in part, to the expansion of the scope of antidumping regulation during this
round to cover imports not priced at full cost. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 2.4, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919,
T.I.A.S. 9650, 1186 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter GATT 1979 Antidumping Code] (permitting
dumping margins to be calculated by comparing the export price of the product to the cost of
its production in the country of origin when there were no sales of the product in the country
of origin); see also Finger, supra note 60, at 27 (suggesting that this expansion was perhaps the
most significant in the development of antidumping measures into an anti-import tool).
67. The 1979 Code reduced the causation requirement of the injury test from that in the
1967 Code. See GATT 1979 Antidumping Code, supra note 66, arts. 3.1, 3.4 (requiring that in
order to impose antidumping duties, dumped imports must be found to have caused injury).
68. See id. art. 3.2-.4 (listing factors to consider in the dumping and injury investigations
but emphasizing that no one factor was dispositive).
69. See id. art. 5.1-.2 (stating that an investigation shall be initiated upon a sufficient
showing that dumped imports are causing injury to a domestic industry and requiring
determinations of the existence of dumping and the presence of injury to take place
simultaneously).
70. See id. art. 5.3 (requiring investigations to be “terminated promptly” when the
investigating authority determines there is not “sufficient evidence” of dumping or injury).
71. See id.; see also CROOME, supra note 2, at 80-81 (listing the new antidumping agreements
reached at the Tokyo Round).
72. See 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 95.
73. See id. (listing the number of issues relating to antidumping that remained unresolved
just weeks before the Draft Final Act was due for release). This was the case despite the fact that
revision of the Antidumping Code was not considered a priority when the round was launched.
See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 685. The Draft Final Act also was known as the “Dunkel
Draft.” See 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 96.
74. See 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 97 (stating that these and other major
users “expressed the need to clarify the reach of Article VI to deal with efforts by certain
producers to circumvent antidumping orders”). Circumvention situations included attempts by
dumping companies to “[shift] sources of supply an affiliate in a third country,” export dumped
parts to a third country for assembly before shipment to the investigating country, and ship
parts or components when there was a sudden expansion of output and imports to the
investigating country for assembly, even though most parts were really from the home country
and only a small value was added through assembly. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 306.
75. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 82.

for protectionist purposes.76 These targeted countries wanted to
reduce the discretion of governments in interpreting the Code by
maximizing the transparency of the GATT rules.77
Given these two extremes, and the very politicized nature of the
issue, there was little room or inclination to compromise. It is no
surprise that the gap remained as the round progressed.78 The
resulting Draft Final Act was, of necessity, as much a product of
decree by the Secretariat as a product of negotiation among the
parties.79 It raised the threshold for dumping and injury findings on
the one hand, and included provisions that would allow action
against circumvention on the other.80
76. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 685; supra note 13 (naming the countries
concerned with the protectionist use of antidumping laws).
77. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 82 (asserting that these countries argued for “tight and
explicit” antidumping rules in order to negate the discretion of governments in the
enforcement of the rules); 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 95 (“Some [major
targeted countries] wanted to reduce discretion of governments in interpreting the Code
and/or wanted to make resort to Article VI more difficult or demanding.”).
78. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 208 (“Renewal of discussions on the anti-dumping code
showed no narrowing in the gap which remained between the diametrically opposed positions
of the main supplying and importing countries.”); 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 95
(“[A]nti-dumping was one of only three negotiating areas unable to forward a negotiating text
to Brussels for the December 1990 ministerial meeting.”). Even as the negotiators were
preparing the Draft Final Act in 1991, the issue of antidumping remained unresolved. The
critical remaining issues included averaging, sales below cost of production, constructed value,
factors to be considered in an injury analysis, standing, de minimis dumping margins, negligible
import volumes, cumulation of imports from multiple countries in an injury analysis, sampling,
sunset provisions, anti-circumvention provisions and dispute settlement. See id. The debate
spilled over into a few pending matters under GATT dispute settlement, which in turn
intensified the feeling of doom in Geneva. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 304-36 (referring to
feelings of mutual distrust, tension and gridlock). A GATT panel ruled that a European
Community action against producers of Japanese-owned assembly plants in Britain and France
was unjustified. See EEC--Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, L/6657-37S/132
(May 16, 1990) (unpublished GATT Panel Report), available in 1990 GATTPD LEXIS 3. The
European Community, however, refused to comply until anti-circumvention provisions were
added to the GATT. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 304. Meanwhile, Japan threatened that it
would not consider such amendments until the European Community complied with the
panel’s finding. See id.
79. See 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 95-96 (explaining that the polarization of
individual countries over antidumping was so intense that the Secretariat created the text that
was included in the Draft Final Act as a compromise).
80. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 305-06. More specifically, the Draft Final Act included the
following changes that pleased the exporting countries: elimination of the presumption that
below-cost sales and lower prices due to delayed adjustments to change in exchange rate
constituted dumping; the addition of a requirement that prevented members from comparing
isolated export selling prices with average prices in the home market unless there was evidence
that the sellers were targeting particular regions, purchasers or periods for dumping; greater
emphasis on ascertaining whether dumping was the factor causing the domestic industry injury;
the addition of language prohibiting members from initiating investigations in the absence of
evidence of industry support or if the dumping margin was less than two percent (i.e., de
minimis); and the creation of a sunset clause, which provided for the expiration of duties after
five years unless proof existed that their continuance was necessary to prevent injury. See id.
For the countries most often subjected to antidumping investigations, the Draft Final Act
allowed sampling in fragmented industries and allowed action to be taken in response to many

The United States, in particular, was not satisfied with the text and
continued to propose new changes.81 Many participants feared that a
holdout on the part of the United States would threaten the success
of the entire round.82 In the end, the participants made several
concessions to the United States.83 The result was the WTO
Antidumping Code.84 Agreement on antidumping set into motion
the resolution of the remaining open issues and successfully
encouraged over 100 countries to sign the Uruguay Round Final Act
in Marrakesh, Morocco in April, 1994.85
D. A Brief Overview of Dispute Settlement in the WTO
The Uruguay Round, through the DSU,86 produced the first fullyintegrated dispute settlement procedure in the history of the GATT.87
In an effort to decrease the occurrences of unilateral action by the
Member states, the WTO Agreement requires aggrieved parties to
follow certain procedures in a dispute settlement before the WTO.88
These procedures are more precise and expeditious than those
under the GATT.89
circumvention situations. See id. at 306.
81. See id. at 365 (identifying the U.S.’ forward-looking recommendations on the
antidumping conflict).
82. See id. (chronicling the other participants’ general concern over the frail nature of the
Draft Final Act).
83. The United States requested 11 changes and received several of them. See id. at 374.
The parties reached an agreement on the standard of review to be employed in the WTO’s
dispute resolution proceedings. Panels were given the authority to scrutinize the way the
national authority handled the matter but could not examine the facts of the case. See id.; see
also discussion infra Part III (giving an example of this constraint in practice in the Portland
Cement Panel Report). As the United States had requested, labor unions were accorded the
right to file petitions for an investigation. See CROOME, supra note 2, at 374. Another
concession to the United States was that the WTO Agreement did not change the sunset and de
minimis provisions as drastically as the Draft Final Act had. See id. Finally, the anticircumvention provisions were strengthened. See id.
84. See WTO Antidumping Code, supra note 16. The Agreement is contained in Annex 1A
of the WTO Agreement.
85. See WTO Agreement, supra note 37; see also Hurabiell, supra note 47, at 570.
86. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 114 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
87. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 340 (explaining that the DSU regulates the process
of dispute settlement under all covered WTO agreements).
88. See DSU, supra note 86, art. 1.1 (stating that “[t]he rules and procedures of this
Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the agreements listed”) (emphasis added).
89. See Hudec, supra note 29, at 101 (noting that WTO dispute resolution provides
Members automatic access to a neutral panel, sets forth a “sophisticated litigation process
leading to binding legal rulings by the panel,” provides an appellate tribunal to review panel
rulings and specifies the procedure under which retaliatory sanctions can be employed in the
event that losing parties fail to implement rulings); Steele, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that WTO
mechanisms for dispute settlement are expected to be more effective than those of the GATT
because of an increased emphasis on rights, obligations and the monitoring for compliance).

After finding a violation, a panel will first issue a recommendation
to the respondent that it cease the offending action. The panel will
make its recommendation in a report that is to be adopted by the
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) unless the WTO Members
unanimously decide against adoption.90 The Dispute Settlement
Body monitors implementation of the report’s recommendations.91
The respondent must bring the violative measure(s) into conformity
with WTO obligations within a reasonable amount of time.92 If the
respondent fails to comply with the remedial measures, the parties
may negotiate a form of compensation, which usually involves a grant
of further concessions by the offending party to the prevailing one.93
If the parties cannot agree upon mutually acceptable compensation
within twenty days, the injured party may seek authority from the DSB
to suspend some of the concessions it has made to the respondent.94
An objection to the level or scope of any such retaliatory measures
will prompt the involvement of an arbitrator.95
This ability to engage in retaliation existed under the GATT.96 The
DSU, however, changed the procedure by which the DSB authorizes
retaliation. In the past, there had to be a consensus in the DSB to
90. See DSU, supra note 86, art. 16.4 (“[T]he report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting
unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report.”); see also WTO Agreement, supra note 37, art.
IX.1 n.1 (“The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus . . . if no
member . . . formally objects to the proposed decision.”). The Dispute Settlement Body is a
special assembly of the WTO General Council, and includes all WTO members. See DSU, supra
note 86, art. 2.
91. See DSU, supra note 86, art. 21.6 (“The DSB shall keep under surveillance the
implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings.”).
92. See id. art. 21.3 (discussing the reasonable period of time within which the DSB must be
informed regarding implementation of the recommendations).
93. See id. art. 22.2 (providing the procedure and timeframe for consultations and the
negotiation of compensation).
94. See id. (“If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date
of expiry of the reasonable period . . . any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the concessions or other
obligations.”). This form of sanction is called “retaliation.” See LANJOUW, supra note 43, at 2021. For guidelines regarding retaliation, see DSU, supra note 86, art. 22.3.
95. See DSU, supra note 86, art. 22.6 (outlining Members’ recourse upon the suspension of
concessions and the manner in which arbitration proceeds).
96. Under the GATT regime, the suspension of concessions was one allowable sanction in
the dispute resolution mechanism. Article XXIII of the agreement provided that, if a party felt
that another party was “nullifying” or “impairing” a benefit afforded to the party under the
GATT and the two parties could not reach a solution, the aggrieved party could refer the
matter to a panel for dispute settlement. See GATT 1947, supra note 26, art. XXIII.2 (“If the
[panel] consider[s] that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, [it] may
authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions . . . as [it] determine[s] to be appropriate in the
circumstances.”); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 327 (explaining that this sanction was
allowed if a violation was not remedied and noting that it was utilized only one time under the
GATT, in 1955).

grant the petitioner the right to withdraw concessions.97 This need
for unanimous agreement effectively gave target countries veto
power.98 Under the current WTO regime, the consensus requirement
is now reversed, such that the grant is automatic unless all members
of the DSB, including the prevailing party, decide to the contrary.99
Also, because the standard of review that panels apply to decisions by
national administrative authorities is now more transparent, results
under the new procedure should be more uniform and predictable.100
E. The Debate Over a Higher Threshold for Initiation of Investigations: The
Issues of Standing and an Evidentiary Burden
The threshold for initiating an antidumping investigation has a
considerable effect on the number of investigations that a nation
conducts, as well as the number of complaints that parties file.
Clearly, if there were no minimum filing requirements, the number
of investigations would surge because domestic producers would be
able to use investigations as a tool to stifle foreign competition.
Conversely, if the threshold were extremely high, few complaints
would result in an investigation and dumping would effectively go
unchecked. A high threshold requirement for the petitioner that
would effectively require conclusive proof of dumping and injury—
the purpose of the investigation itself—makes little sense. There is a
fine line between these two extremes, one that the main exporting
and importing countries believe should be drawn in very different
places.101
As mentioned above, the issues of standing and an evidentiary
97. See MOON, supra note 28, at 90 (explaining the consensus requirement for dispute
rulings under the GATT).
98. See id.; see also ROWLEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 314 (suggesting that, in practice, the
small countries abided by dispute settlement procedures under the GATT and the large
countries routinely ignored them).
99. See DSU, supra note 86, art. 22.6.
100. See MOON, supra note 28, at 90. The panel can only overturn the national authority’s
finding if it determines that the authority’s factual or legal evaluation was erroneous. The
standard is that the authority’s evaluation of the facts must be unbiased and objective. The
panel cannot overturn a finding at the national level merely because it would have decided the
matter differently. See Steele, supra note 7, at 5.
Jackson points out that the dispute resolution system and, in particular, the suspension of
concessions, is an area in which the disparity between developing and developed countries is
especially acute. The suspension of concessions by a large trading country to a developing
country could be devastating. The reverse scenario, however, might have little, if any, effect on
the powerful country and might actually hurt the interests of the developing country. See
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 346-47.
101. Companies, industries and interest groups all seek to affect the position of individual
countries. This pressure creates a politically dangerous issue that politicians are loathe to
address. See generally Finger, supra note 60, at 26-28 (discussing the role that politics and
industry have played in antidumping law).

burden comprise the threshold requirement of initiation. To date,
the standing issue has been the more contentious of the two. The
breakdown of positions among the WTO Members with respect to the
appropriate threshold tends to depend on whether the Member is
primarily an exporting or importing country.102 During the Uruguay
Round, the countries that are most often investigated cited an
excessive number of frivolous cases and argued that the standing
requirement should be clarified and made a mandatory prerequisite
to any investigation.103
The countries most often initiating
investigations pushed for more discretion, looser standards, and a
presumption of industry support in the standing determination.104
Although the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code of 1979 included
two provisions to clarify the standing issue, the provisions lacked
definition.105 Coupled with the Members’ polarized views, this
ambiguity made standing a controversial, and therefore critical, issue
in the Uruguay Round.106
During the Uruguay Round deliberations on antidumping, many
aspects of the standing issue were contentious. Such issues included
whether countries should have an affirmative obligation to confirm
the standing information asserted by a petitioner before commencing
an investigation,107 what percentage of an industry must be
102. See 2 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1575, 1578 (outlining the variations in
importing and exporting countries’ interpretations of standing in particular).
103. See 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 97 (pointing out that some countries
promoted strict threshold levels to reduce the possibility of frivolous cases); see also 2
NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1578 (comparing the divergent interpretations of the
standing requirement).
104. See 2 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1578 (discussing the conflicting standing
recommendations proffered by countries in support of their views on antidumping
investigations).
105. See id. The provisions were Articles 4.1 and 5 of the 1979 Code. Article 4.1 provided:
“In determining injury the term ‘domestic industry’ shall be interpreted as referring to the
domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output
of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those
products . . . .” GATT 1979 Antidumping Code, supra note 66, art. 4.1. Article 5 stated: “An
investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall be
initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry affected.” Id. art.
5.1. Neither “major proportion” nor “by or on behalf of” was defined. See 2 NEGOTIATING
HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1579.
106. See 2 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1579. Despite this ambiguity, the
occurrence of antidumping investigations increased following the Tokyo Round. See Steele,
supra note 7, at 2-3; supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in use of
antidumping laws following the Tokyo Round). This development had many consequences,
including a highly visible divergence of views and interpretations of the rules among member
countries, “a growth industry for those adroit at exploiting the potential of anti-dumping action
as part of the weaponry of industries facing import competition,” and heightened tension
among members. Steele, supra note 7, at 3. These factors were also decisive in placing reform
of the antidumping code high on the Uruguay Round agenda. See id.
107. See 2 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1579.

represented when the entire industry is not the petitioner,108 whether
workers or their representatives should have the ability to bring a
petition,109 how producers who are related to foreign producers
under investigation or who are themselves importers should be
treated,110 how fragmented industries should be treated,111 and how
silence on the part of particular industry members should be
interpreted.112
The Draft Final Act settled many of the previously unresolved
threshold issues,113 and the draft provisions were then carried over
into the Final Act (i.e., the WTO Agreement). With regard to the
evidentiary burden, a request for an investigation must include
sufficient evidence of dumping, a cognizable injury under Article VI,
and a causal link between the dumping and injury. 114 The Code also
delineated specific standing requirements including the following:
(1) prior to an investigation, the authorities must determine that the
petition has been filed by or on behalf of the industry;115 (2) the
petition must be supported by domestic producers who account for at
least twenty-five percent of the domestic production; (3) authorities
may use sampling to determine industry positions in the case of
fragmented industries;116 (4) producers who are related to foreign
producers subject to investigation, and producers who are themselves
importers, may be excluded from the standing determination;117
(5) workers are interested parties;118 and (6) silence on the part of
particular industry members does not expressly count for or against
initiation.119
108. See id. at 1584 (noting that there was disagreement over the percentage that would
yield adequate representation).
109. See 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 97.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. Stewart charted the views of the various negotiating parties on this issue. They
ranged from wanting silence to be interpreted as a lack of support to neutral to “at least
neutral, if not affirmative.” See id. at 98.
113. See 2 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at 1584 (summarizing the evolving
compromises).
114. See WTO Antidumping Code, supra note 16, arts. 5.2, 5.4.
115. See id. art. 5.4.
116. See id. art. 5.4 n.13 (“In the case of fragmented industries involving an exceptionally
large number of producers, authorities may determine support and opposition by using
statistically valid sampling techniques.”).
117. See id. art. 4.1(i) (“[W]hen producers are related to the exporters or importers or are
themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term ‘domestic industry’ may be
interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers . . . .”).
118. See id. art. 5.4 n.14 (“Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members
employees of domestic producers of the like product or representatives of those employees may
make or support an application for an investigation under paragraph 1.”).
119. See id. art. 5.4. Stewart points out that the language of Article 5.4 suggests that
“substantial silence could count against a petitioner.” 1 NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 12, at

As a result of the Uruguay Round, then, the issue of standing was
largely settled, while the issue of an evidentiary burden remained
vague and untested.
II. ANTIDUMPING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Antidumping Measures and Investigations
A majority of all the trade actions initiated in the United States
against unfairly traded imports are brought under the antidumping
law.120 The cornerstone of U.S. antidumping law is Title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930.121 In the last two decades, changing circumstances
in the world economy, as well as changes in the GATT, have forced
five major revisions of the law.122
The Treasury Department and the International Trade
Commission (“ITC”) enforced antidumping law in the United States
until the Tokyo Round of the GATT, which required a restructuring
of U.S. law.123 Since 1980, the International Trade Administration of
the Commerce Department (“ITA”) and the ITC have shared
responsibility for administering the law.124 To initiate an injury

96-97 (emphasis added).
120. See Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, United States—Latin American Trade
Laws, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 111, 151 n.401 (1995) (citing the statistic that
antidumping investigations represented 67% of all U.S. trade actions between 1990 and 1994).
Some critics claim that the laws have been ineffective in preventing dumping and that, given
this fact, the Commerce Department should desist from levying duties. See Hurabiell, supra
note 47, at 575-76 (mentioning particularly the criticism of economists “who claim that
[antidumping] is inefficient and robs consumers of lower prices” (citations omitted)).
121. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 685 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-1677j (1994)). The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”) made changes to Title
VII of the Act. See URAA, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 3511 (1994)); see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 60, at 2-1.
122. See Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation, Integrated International Production,
and the United States Antidumping Laws, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 55-56 (1997) (suggesting
that the language of the statute has become more precise and specific, and the discretion of the
administering agencies has decreased, with each revision).
There is debate over the obligations of the United States with regard to the antidumping laws
of the GATT/WTO and, more specifically, whether the GATT/WTO Agreement “trumps” U.S.
law. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 318-26; see also JACKSON, supra note 31, at 75-77
(discussing whether the GATT itself has direct application in U.S. courts).
123. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 691. The pre-Tokyo Round U.S. law required a
demonstration, not of material injury, but merely of injury; it also granted considerable
discretion to the national authorities, which resulted in the levying of few antidumping duties.
See 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1) (1976) (repealed 1979).
Jackson maintains that while the
restructuring produced significant procedural changes relating to the shift in administrative
control, the substantive changes were not as significant. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at
691.
124. For further discussion of the co-administration of U.S. antidumping law, see Tracy
Murray, The Administration of the Antidumping Duty Law by the Department of Commerce, in DOWN IN
THE DUMPS, supra note 9, at 23, 25.

investigation, a petitioner first files a complaint with both agencies.125
The ITA then decides whether to initiate an investigation.126 The
ITC, in turn, makes the preliminary determination of injury.127 The
ITA then makes its preliminary and final determinations of the
existence of dumping.128 Finally, the ITC makes its final injury
125. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(2) (1994).
126. See id. § 1673(c)(2).
127. See id. § 1673a(c)(1)(A)(i); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 718. In the
preliminary injury determination, the ITC must find a “reasonable indication” that the injury
test could be satisfied. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a)(1).
128. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1). In the course of its investigation, the ITA distributes
questionnaires to the respondents. See Stewart, supra note 9, at 300-02 (discussing the burden
of questionnaires used by the ITA in its determinations). The questionnaires the ITA sends to
foreign respondents are daunting, to say the least. The ITA’s questionnaires request far more
detailed information of the foreign respondent than the ITC requires of the petitioner
regarding injury. See Murray, supra note 124, at 34-35. Murray provides some insight into the
tribulation facing the foreign respondent:
It arrives in the form of a questionnaire, some 100 pages long, in English, requesting
specific accounting data on individual sales in the home market (and possibly to third
countries), data on sales to the United States, data needed to adjust arm’s-length
market prices to net ex-factory prices (that is, packing costs, shipping costs, selling
costs, distributor and other middleman costs, adjustments for taxes and duties on
imported inputs, and adjustments for exporter’s sales prices, international shipping
costs, tariffs in the United States, distribution costs in the United States, and any costs
of adding value in the United States), and a host of other details . . . . There must be
enough information for the [ITA] to investigate nearly every U.S. sale . . . for a period
of six months. All this information must be identified, retrieved, recorded, and then
transmitted to the [ITA] in English on hard copy and in a computer-readable format
within the short deadline stipulated under the U.S. antidumping statutes.
Id. at 34. The respondent usually has 30 days to return the ITA’s questionnaire. See N. David
Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative Nontariff Barrier, in DOWN IN THE
DUMPS, supra note 9, at 64, 67.
Until the Uruguay Round, the ITA and ITC based their determinations on the “best
information available.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1984) (amended 1994); see also Murray, supra
note 124, at 33-34 (citing ITA regulations). In practice, the ITA refused to consider responses
that were incomplete or in the wrong computer format, even when the respondent had
substantially complied but was honestly unable to comply fully with the detailed request. See id.
When the ITA considered a response inadequate, it could consider, and even base its
determination upon, unverified information submitted by the petitioner. See 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.37(b) (1993) (“The best information available may include factual information submitted
in support of the petition or subsequently submitted by interested parties.”); cf. Murray, supra
note 124, at 34 (questioning whether such conduct actually produces the “best information
available”).
This practice had to be revised as a result of the Uruguay Round. The WTO Antidumping
Code sets forth guidelines for the use of information presented in a submission. First, the
authorities may use “the facts available” to make determinations only if the respondent does not
provide necessary information within a reasonable time. See WTO Antidumping Code, supra
note 16, art. 6.8. Second, the authorities cannot reject an entire submission as long as some of
the information is usable. See id., annex II, art. 3. Third, the authorities should consider the
media or computer languages at the disposal of the respondent. See id., annex II, art. 2. Finally,
the authorities should attempt to verify information contained in any secondary source to which
they must resort. See id., annex II, art. 7. The URAA implemented parallel changes in U.S. law.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (“When the administering authority . . . relies on secondary
information rather than on information obtained in the course of an investigation . . . the
administering authority . . . shall corroborate that information from independent sources that
are reasonably at their disposal . . . ”).

determination.129 For antidumping duties to be imposed, both
agencies must make affirmative determinations.130
B. Standing and Evidentiary Burden in the Initiation of Investigations
In its initial determination, the ITA considers the threshold issues
of standing and the evidentiary burden. With regard to the
evidentiary burden, it examines whether the petition properly alleges
a basis for an action and whether it contains the information
reasonably available to the petitioner.131 In determining whether the
petition reasonably supports allegations of dumping, the ITA will not
hear arguments from the respondent as to why an investigation is
unwarranted.132 Finally, the ITA, unlike the governing authorities in
many other countries, does not consider the public interest in
antidumping proceedings.133
As for standing, the ITA ascertains whether the petition was filed by
an appropriate party. An “interested party”134 must file a petition “on
129. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 718 (“If dumping
or subsidization is ultimately determined to exist, the parties return to the ITC for the ‘final’
injury investigation.”).
There are three components to the final injury test in the United States: (1) defining the
related industry, (2) examining the domestic industry for signs or threats of material injury, and
(3) if injury or threat of injury is found, analyzing whether dumping was the cause of such
injury. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 718. If the ITC
concludes that there is no injury or threat of injury, it terminates the investigation. See 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 718.
130. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2); see also J. Michael Finger & Tracy Murray, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Enforcement in the United States, in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS, supra note
9, at 241, 243 (describing the investigation process in the United States). Between 1980 and
1992, the ITA reached an affirmative determination in 93% of the cases, while the ITC reached
such a determination in only 66% of the cases. See Palmeter, supra note 128, at 278 (citing
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW THE GATT AFFECTS U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY POLICY 50 (1994)). The statistics indicate that the injury test, not the
dumping test, has been determinative in a final, positive finding. See Finger & Murray, supra, at
247 (claiming that in the pre-WTO system, 45% of petitions were rendered moot by Voluntary
Export Restraints or “cease and desist” agreements, 13% were rejected based on the preliminary
injury determination, 5% were rejected on the basis of the dumping determination and 14%
were found to contain no injury in the final injury determination).
131. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1)(A) (detailing the initial requirements that a petition must
meet in the determination by the administering authority).
132. See id. § 1673a(b)(3)(B) (prohibiting communication from any person other than an
interested domestic party before the administering authority decides whether to initiate an
investigation); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 693 (stating that the ITA does not
permit respondents to make arguments against the initiation of an investigation).
133. See Palmeter, supra note 128, at 279 (explaining that neither injury to consumers nor a
cost-benefit analysis is considered in making a determination); see also Josephs, supra note 122,
at 70 (“On balance, the benefits of imports to society may far outweigh the harm to the
‘affected industry’ through the creation of new businesses, the availability of superior inputs to
downstream producers of other products, and the increased availability of superior products at
lower prices to consumers.” (citations omitted)).
134. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1).
An “interested party” includes the following:
manufacturers, producers or wholesalers in the United States of a like product; certified or
recognized unions or groups of workers representing an affected U.S. industry; trade or

behalf of an industry.”135 In the petition, the party must identify the
industry on whose behalf it is filed, as well as the identity of other
companies in the industry.136 The complaint must include all of the
information regarding dumping that is “reasonably available to
petitioner.”137
Until implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(“URAA”), the ITA did not conduct an independent investigation of
the degree of support for a particular petition, but instead assumed
that a facially sufficient petition was representative of the domestic
industry.138 Sweden challenged this formulation of standing in 1988,
however, as inconsistent with the GATT Antidumping Code.139 The
GATT panel agreed and recommended the revocation of the
antidumping order.140 Under the dispute resolution mechanisms in
place at the time, the United States was able to block the report from
business associations in which manufacturers, producers or wholesalers of a like product in the
U.S. comprise a majority of the membership; governments of countries in which the goods
under investigation are produced or manufactured; and foreign manufacturers, producers or
exporters of the subject merchandise. See id. § 1677(9).
This determination can become complicated in situations where, for instance, the
petitioning firm uses imported materials to produce its product, the firm is a subsidiary of a
foreign company or owns the foreign source company, or the firm operates at multiple stages of
the production process. See Murray, supra note 124, at 27-28 (further suggesting that these
complications can lead to conflicting interests).
135. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1). The U.S. definition of “industry” is the same as that under
the GATT. See id. § 1677(4)(A). Domestic producers opposed to the petitions and related to
the foreign producer shall be disregarded as part of the domestic industry, unless such
domestic producers demonstrate that their interests as domestic producers would be adversely
affected by the imposition of a dumping order. See id. § 1673a(c)(4)(B)(i). Additionally, the
ITA and ITC may also disregard domestic producers who are also importers of the foreign
product in their determinations of the size of the domestic industry.
See id.
§ 1673a(c)(4)(B)(ii). In order for a petition to be filed “by or on behalf of the industry,” “(i)
the domestic producers or workers who support the petition [must] account for at least 25
percent of the total production of the domestic like product, and (ii) the domestic producers
or workers who support the petition [must] account for more than 50 percent of the
production of the domestic like product produced by that portion of the industry expressing
support for or opposition to the petition.” Id. § 1673a(c)(4)(A).
136. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.202(b)(1)-(2) (1998).
137. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1).
138. See Josephs, supra note 122, at 74-75 (noting the presumption that a facially sufficient
petition was filed by an industry unless contested by the respondent); see also Murray, supra note
124, at 28 (noting an instance in which the Court of International Trade allowed a single firm
to file a petition without further industry support). Instead, the respondent had the burden of
proving that the petitioner was not filing “on behalf of the industry.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)
(1988) (amended 1994) (imposing no explicit requirement that the administering authority
confirm that the petition was filed “on behalf of the industry” prior to initiation).
139. Sweden challenged a U.S. decision to impose antidumping duties on seamless stainless
steel hollow products from Sweden, claiming that U.S. standing requirements were lax and that
the U.S. had violated Article 5.1 of the GATT 1979 Antidumping Code, supra note 66, when the
ITA failed to verify whether the petition had been filed on behalf of the domestic industry. See
U.S.—Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports of Seamless Stainless Steel Hollow
Products from Sweden, ADP/47 (Aug. 20, 1990) (unadopted), available in 1990 GATTPD
LEXIS 1.
140. See id. para. 5.10 (basing its holding upon statutory interpretation of Article 5.1).

being adopted.141 Nonetheless, the panel’s conclusion that industry
support must be substantiated was implemented in the Antidumping
Agreement of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round.142 This decision
forced the United States to rewrite its antidumping law, which it did
through the URAA.143
III. GATT/WTO CASELAW CONSIDERING SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
REQUIREMENTS IN ANTIDUMPING CASES
Cases before GATT or WTO dispute resolution panels on the issue
of an evidentiary threshold are rare. There are two cases in
particular, however, in which this issue was determinative: United
States—Measures Affecting Softwood Lumber from Canada
(“Softwood Lumber”),144 and Guatemala—Antidumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (“Portland Cement”).145
These cases are indicative of the confusion that exists over the
threshold evidentiary requirement in antidumping law and also of
how the threshold that nations apply can influence the outcome of a
case. Although there is no stare decisis principle in effect in
141. See GATT 1994, supra note 16, art. XXIII.2 (“The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a
ruling on the matter, as appropriate.”); James R. Cannon, Jr., Dispute Settlement in Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Cases, in MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK, supra note 25, at 359, 360
(“Because Article XXIII requires a ‘ruling’ by the ‘Contracting Parties,’ panel decisions were
recommendations to the Contracting Parties, rather than rulings. To become enforceable,
panel reports had to be adopted by consensus of the Contracting Parties.”). For the U.S.
action, see Gunnar Fors, Stainless Steel in Sweden: Antidumping Attacks Responsible International
Citizenship, in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS, supra note 9, at 137, 157 (stating that the U.S.
blocked approval of the report from the GATT Antidumping Committee’s agenda).
142. See WTO Antidumping Code, supra note 16, art. 5.4. The provision reads:
An investigation shall not be initiated . . . unless the authorities have determined, on
the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the
application expressed by domestic producers of the like product, that the application
has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry.
Id.
143. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4) (1994) (delineating the rules the administrating authority
now applies in determining industry support). The ITA must now affirmatively determine the
degree of support within the domestic industry before opening an investigation. In other
words, “[The ITA] must establish that the petitioner has standing as a threshold matter.”
Josephs, supra note 122, at 81 n.210 (referring to 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)).
Prior to the Uruguay Round, there was a dispute between the two agencies regarding
responsibility over standing. The ITC claimed that it lacked the authority to determine whether
a particular petitioner had standing. See Murray, supra note 124, at 29. Similarly, in a 1989
ruling, the ITA said it “has consistently declined to decide issues of standing.” See Cass &
Narkin, supra note 12, at 229 n.56 (citing Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade
Fibers from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2234, Inv. No. 731TA-448-50 (Nov. 1989) (Preliminary)). The ITA has rejected a petition for lack of standing in
only one case. See id. at 229. The ITC has never refused to investigate a petition due to lack of
standing.
144. Softwood Lumber Panel Report, supra note 22.
145. Portland Cement Panel Report, supra note 22.

GATT/WTO law, precedents can still be influential.146 The Portland
Cement panel’s reliance upon the Softwood Lumber case is illustrative of
this tendency.
A. Softwood Lumber
In Softwood Lumber, a GATT dispute resolution panel examined the
threshold evidentiary requirements of the GATT countervailing duty
agreement.147 The relevant provisions are substantially similar in
GATT antidumping and countervailing duty laws. The dispositive
provisions in both require that the petition be “on behalf of the
industry affected” and include “sufficient evidence” regarding the
existence of either a subsidy or dumping, injury, and causation.148
The panel noted that, as with the GATT Antidumping Code, the
countervailing duty agreement contained no interpretative guidance
as to the meaning of “sufficient evidence.”149 The panel read the
provision as reflecting a balance between the interest of the domestic
industry in securing the initiation of an investigation and the interest
of the exporting country in avoiding the potentially burdensome
consequences of an investigation initiated on an unmeritorious
basis.150
The panel attempted to pinpoint the amount of evidence that
would be sufficient for the purposes of initiating an investigation. It
placed the appropriate level somewhere between the amount and
type of evidence that “would be required of that authority at the time
of making a final determination” and “mere allegation or
conjecture.”151 The threshold that the panel finally settled on was
146. See Japan--Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (stating that although adopted panel reports are not binding,
they do “create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and therefore, should be taken
into account where they are relevant”).
147. See Softwood Lumber Panel Report, supra note 22, paras. 330-36; see also Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. 9619, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter
GATT Subsidies Code].
148. See GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 147, art. 2.1 (stating that a countervailing duty
investigation should normally be initiated upon a petition “by or on behalf of the industry
affected” which provides “sufficient evidence” of the existence of a prohibited subsidy, injury to
the domestic industry and a causal link between the two); GATT 1979 Antidumping Code, supra
note 66, art. 5.1 (stating that an antidumping investigation should normally be initiated upon a
petition “by or on behalf of the industry affected” which provides “sufficient evidence” of the
existence of dumping, injury to the domestic industry and a causal link between the two).
149. See Softwood Lumber Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 330 (explaining that elementary
rules of legal construction must be used to interpret the intended application of “sufficient
evidence”).
150. See id. para. 331 (emphasizing the anti-harassment function of the “sufficient evidence”
provision).
151. See id. para. 332.

“evidence that provides a reason to believe that a subsidy exists and
that the domestic industry is injured as a result of subsidized
imports.”152
B. Portland Cement
Portland Cement is the first antidumping dispute to be considered by
either a WTO dispute settlement panel or the WTO Appellate
Body.153 Despite the ruling of the Appellate Body that the matter was
not properly before it, the outcome should provide considerable
insight into the way future panels may apply the standing
requirements of the WTO Antidumping Code.
On October 15, 1996, Mexico requested consultations with
Guatemala regarding the initiation and conduct of Guatemala’s
antidumping investigation of grey portland cement from Cruz Azul, a
Mexican Producer.154 In January, 1997, based on a petition from the
sole Guatemalan cement producer, Guatemala’s Ministry of Economy
levied an antidumping duty of 89.54% on imports of grey portland
cement from Cruz Azul.155 Mexico then requested the establishment
of a panel on February 4, 1997.156 The Dispute Settlement Body
established a panel on March 20, 1997.157 The panel, finding for
Mexico, released its final report to the parties on May 18, 1998 and to
the public on June 19, 1998.158
Guatemala appealed the decision on August 4, 1998.159 On
November 2, 1998, the Appellate Body concluded that the dispute
had not properly been before the Panel.160 As a result, it was unable
152. See id. para. 333.
153. See Third-Party Submission of the United States, June 25, 1997, Portland Cement Panel
Report, supra note 22, para. 1 [hereinafter U.S. Submission] (describing this as the first dispute
involving antidumping under the WTO).
154. See Guatemala—Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico:
Request for Consultations by Mexico, WT/DS60/1 (Oct. 24, 1996). Consultation is required by
Article 4 of the DSU as well as Article 17 of the WTO Antidumping Code. See DSU, supra note
86, art. 4; WTO Antidumping Code, supra note 16, art. 17.
155. See Guatemala—Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico:
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico, WT/DS60/2 (Feb. 13, 1997) [hereinafter
Mexican Complaint] (pointing out that this was “well above” the amount claimed by Cruz
Azul).
156. See id.
157. See Portland Cement Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 1.5.
158. See id. para. 1.11; supra notes 187-217 (discussing the panel’s holding).
159. See Notification of an Appeal by Guatemala under Paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
WT/DS60/9 (Aug. 4, 1998).
160. See Portland Cement Appellate Body Report, supra note 22, para. 88. The Appellate Body
concluded that, due to its definition of the term “measure” in Article 17 of the Antidumping
Code, Mexico had to identify the antidumping duty, the acceptance of a price undertaking or a
provisional measure as part of the matter being referred to the DSB. See id. para. 80. Mexico
had contested this interpretation and thus did not see a need to identify either the final duty or

to review the substantive findings of the Panel regarding Guatemala’s
initiation of the antidumping investigation.161 The Appellate Body
did, however, leave open the possibility of Mexico “seeking
consultations with Guatemala regarding the latter’s imposition of
definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of portland cement from
Mexico and . . .pursuing another dispute settlement complaint under
the provisions of Article 17 of the Anti-dumping Agreement and of
the DSU.”162 As a result, the Panel Report does not carry the weight
of other Panel Reports; it has, in effect, been overturned on
procedural grounds. Nevertheless, it is dispositive of how future
panels may evaluate the substantive issues relating to standing.163
Mexico cited a number of reasons indicating that Guatemala’s
evaluation of the facts was not objective.164 First, according to
Guatemalan law, the Ministry must accept the validity of any evidence
submitted to it by an applicant; the burden is on other interested
parties to rebut this presumption.165 Second, the Ministry endeavored
to bolster the application by requesting additional information from
the applicant.166 Third, the application was insufficient.167 Finally, the
investigating authority “assumed the role of applicant” and requested
information from the customs agency to supplement the application,
and then it initiated its investigation before receiving the information
it sought.168
According to Mexico, the national authority was not justified in
launching an investigation merely because the application contained
all the information reasonably available to the applicant. Rather, it
had an obligation to evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of the

the provisional duty as the specific measure at issue. See id. paras. 81-89. According to Mexico,
it was disputing Guatemala’s initiation of the investigation and several aspects of the
investigation itself. See id. para. 82. In fact, Mexico explicitly stated that it was not challenging
Guatemala’s final determination, although it did suggest that the panel revoke the final duty if
its claims were established. See id. para. 85. As a result, the panel was not entitled to examine
Mexico’s claims. See id. para. 88. Not only did the Appellate Body reverse the panel’s contrary
interpretation of “measure,” see id. para. 90, but it also reversed the panel’s finding that Article
17 of the Antidumping Code replaced the provisions of the DSU in antidumping cases. See id.
para. 90; see also id. paras. 64-80 (discussing the relationship between the two).
161. See id. para. 89.
162. Id.
163. In a system with no stare decisis, one could argue that the status of a panel report
reversed on procedural grounds is not far beneath that of an adopted panel report. Future
panels may choose to look to its logic, but are not bound by it. See supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
164. See Portland Cement Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 4.112.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.

evidence submitted in the petition.169 With regard to Mexico’s third
claim, Mexico argued that the petitioner did not substantiate its
claims of dumping with relevant evidence;170 that it did not submit
any evidence regarding threat of injury to the Guatemalan industry,
but instead made allegations and conjectures;171 and that it was able
to supply only allegations as to the causal relationship between the
alleged dumping and threat of injury.172
Guatemala made a number of arguments in response. It asserted
that the quantity and quality of evidence necessary to justify the
initiation of an investigation was significantly lower than that
necessary to make an affirmative preliminary or final finding.173 It
also argued that a national authority is justified in initiating an
investigation based on an application that includes all of the
information reasonably available to the applicant regarding each of
the categories of information described in Article 5.2(i)-(iv).174
Guatemala thus suggested that Article 5.3’s requirement that the
authorities examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence to
make a determination of its sufficiency is satisfied when the petition
includes all the information reasonably available to the petitioner.
The United States filed a third-party submission in the matter.175
Concerning the issue of sufficiency of evidence, the United States
generally discussed the threshold level that a petitioner must meet to
invoke an investigation properly.176 The United States cited Article
5.2 of the Antidumping Code, requiring that a petition contain more
than “simple assertions, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence.”177 The
United States also affirmed the rule, set out in Article 5.2, requiring
that the domestic industry’s petition contain information “reasonably

169. See id. para. 7.48. According to Mexico, the term “accuracy” implies an obligation on
the part of the national authority to establish the truth and relevance of the information. See id.
para. 4.162.
170. See id. para. 4.132 (reiterating Mexico’s contention that the only evidence of the
normal value (i.e., the Guatemalan market price) was two invoices, each for one sack of
cement).
171. See id. para. 4.139 (reciting Mexico’s claim that Guatemala had substantiated its claim
of threatened injury with photocopies of two import certificates—and that Guatemala did not
even receive these until after it had made the decision to initiate).
172. See id. para. 4.150.
173. See id. para. 4.115.
174. See id. para. 4.133.
175. See U.S. Submission, supra note 153.
176. See Portland Cement Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 5.19. The United States also
presented its views on the appropriateness of Mexico’s complaint, the level of review that the
panel should apply, the timing of Guatemala’s notification to Mexico regarding the
investigation and the use of specific or retroactive remedies in antidumping and countervailing
duty disputes. See id. paras. 5.18-.70.
177. Id. para. 5.34.

available” to it.178 The United States argued that the national
authorities have a responsibility to examine the petition for accuracy
and adequacy of evidence.179 Moreover, it advocated that the
antidumping arena adopt the balancing test used for countervailing
duties in Softwood Lumber.180
The United States focused its analysis on “[t]he adequacy of the
information provided in the application and on which the initiation
was based,” which was dependent upon the meaning of the term
“reasonably available to the applicant.”181
The United States
suggested that the standard was “intended to prevent the imposition
of unreasonable information requirements that go beyond not only
the normal capacity of a private entity to develop, but also beyond
those of a particular applicant in a given case.”182 As a result,
confidential information such as pricing, cost of production, and
profitability information would not be required, nor would
information whose obtainment would be practically or legally
prohibitive.183
Although the Antidumping Code contains no such requirement,
the United States suggested that a petitioner claiming that critical
data is unavailable should provide some explanation for its
unavailability.184 If the authorities would expect the domestic industry
to have access to such data, an explanation for its absence would be
particularly essential, in the view of the United States.185 In the case at

178. See id. Such information is required regarding the volume and value of the domestic
production of the product by the applicant, the identity of the industry on behalf of which the
application is made, a description of the allegedly dumped product, the existence of dumping
and the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. See id. para. 5.34 (citing
Article 5.2 (i)-(iv) of the WTO Antidumping Code); see also infra note 188 (quoting Article 5.2).
179. See Portland Cement Panel Report, supra note 22, para. 5.34 (referring to Article 5.3 of
the WTO Antidumping Code).
180. See id. (stating that the initiation requirements used in Softwood Lumber “reflect a careful
balancing of the interest of the domestic industry in the country of importation in securing the
initiation of an anti-dumping investigation and the interest of the exporting country in avoiding
the potentially burdensome consequences of an anti-dumping investigation initiated on an
unmeritorious basis”).
181. Id. para. 5.39. The U.S.’ submission addressed the prospective role of the panel in
reviewing Guatemala’s acts, rather than the role that the Guatemalan authorities should have
played. See id. The United States made it clear that, in its view, the panel’s role was only to
determine whether the information relied upon by the investigating authorities and reasonably
available to the applicant was sufficient to persuade an unprejudiced person that sufficient
evidence of dumping, injury and causation existed. See id. para. 5.37. The panel’s role was not
to conduct a de novo review of the evidence that Guatemala had considered. See id.
182. Id. para. 5.39.
183. See id. (defining circumstances when information may not be considered “reasonably
available” to an applicant).
184. See id. (stating that the “reasonably available” language may not be used as an excuse to
avoid providing certain critical information).
185. See id. para. 5.37.

hand, the United States advised the panel to pursue the issue of the
reasonable availability of data pertaining to the dumping and import
volume, as Guatemalan authorities provided no justification for the
meager amount of evidence submitted with the petition.186
The determination of the panel in fact hinged on this issue,
namely its interpretation of Article 5.3 of the Antidumping Code.
The panel ultimately concluded that, considering the information
available to the Guatemalan authorities at the time that they made
the determination to initiate an investigation, there was not sufficient
information regarding dumping, injury and causation to warrant the
initiation of an investigation.187
The panel first looked at whether Article 5.3 imposes an additional
obligation upon the national authority above the requirements set
out in Article 5.2.188 The panel determined that compliance with the
186. See id. para. 5.40 (asking whether the applicant provided all of the reasonably available
information in accordance with Article 5.2(iii) and (iv) of the WTO Antidumping Code).
Nonetheless, the United States concluded that the Guatemalan authority considered the
required factors, and that its factual findings were without bias and properly established. See id.
para. 5.52. Therefore, because of the standard of review, although the United States suggested
that the Guatemalan authorities should have reached the opposite conclusion, it was forced to
recommend that the original finding be upheld. The United States pointed out that Articles
3.4 and 3.7 of the GATT do not require national authorities to detail all of the listed factors in
an injury or threat of injury determination, because “the lists are not exhaustive and no single
factor or group of factors is decisive.” See id. It stated that the national authorities can “discern
the relative importance of each factor in the particular circumstances of each investigation.” See
id.
187. See id. paras. 7.79-.80. Specifically, the panel concluded that, based on the information
available to the investigating authority at the time of its determination, a reasonable person
could not have found that there was sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and causation. See
id. para. 7.79. For a discussion of the appropriate standard of review determined by the panel,
see paras. 7.56-.57.
188. See id. para. 7.46.
Article 5.2 stipulates that a petition must include evidence of dumping, injury and a causal
link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. See WTO Antidumping Code, supra
note 16, art. 5.2. It continues, “Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot
be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph.” Id. It then sets out four
areas regarding which “[t]he application shall contain such information as is reasonably
available to the applicant.” Id. They are:
(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the
domestic production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written application
is made on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify the industry
on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers of
the like product (or associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to
the extent possible, a description of the volume and value of domestic production of
the like product accounted for by such producers; (ii) a complete description of the
allegedly dumped product, the name of the country or countries of origin or export in
question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign producer and a list of known
persons importing the product in question; (iii) information on prices at which the
product in question is sold when destined for consumption in the domestic markets of
the country or countries of origin or export (or, where appropriate, information on
the prices at which the product is sold from the country or countries of origin or
export to a third country or countries, or on the constructed value of the product)
and information on export prices, or where appropriate, on the prices at which the

requirements of Article 5.2 is not determinative of whether there is
sufficient evidence to justify initiation.189 On the contrary, it found
that it is the obligation inherent in Article 5.3 that is determinative of
the sufficiency of an application.190 The panel interpreted the
requirements in Articles 5.2 and 5.3 as imposing separate obligations
on the applicant and the national authority, respectively.191
According to the panel, the investigating authority’s obligation is
invoked after it has determined that the application contains
evidence on dumping, injury, and the causal link between the two, as
well as whatever information is reasonably available to the applicant
regarding the factors in Article 5.2(i)-(iv).192 The panel described the
further requisite examination of the evidence and information in the
application as follows: “If the investigating authority were to
determine that the evidence and information in the application was
not accurate, or that it was not adequate to support a conclusion that
there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation of an investigation,
the investigating authority would be precluded from initiating an
investigation.”193
For further guidance in interpreting Article 5.3, the panel looked
to the purpose of the initiation requirements in general, which it
determined is to establish a balance “between the competing interests
of ‘the import competing domestic industry in the importing country
in securing the initiation of [an] investigation and the interest of the
exporting country in avoiding the potentially burdensome
consequences of [an] investigation initiated on an unmeritorious
basis.’”194 The Portland Cement panel thus adopted the balancing test
set out in the Softwood Lumber panel report. Considering the
requirements in this context, the panel found that the interpretation
of Article 5.3 advocated by Guatemala “would undermine the
product is first resold to an independent buyer in the territory of the importing
Member; (iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped
imports, the effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic
market and the consequent impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as
demonstrated by such relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the
domestic industry, such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3.
Id. Article 5.3 provides, “The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in the application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify
the initiation of an investigation.” Id. art. 5.3.
189. See id. para. 7.49.
190. See id.
191. See id. para. 7.5 (“Article 5.2 sets forth what evidence and information must be in the
application . . . . Article 5.3 on the other hand sets forth what the investigating authority is to do
when confronted with an application . . . .”).
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Id. para. 7.52 (citing Softwood Lumber Panel Report).

balancing of competing interests in initiation and non-initiation
established in Article 5.”195
The panel also considered relevant Article 5.8, which states, “An
application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation
terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are
satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of
injury to justify proceeding with the case.”196 Guatemala argued that
the provision did not apply to the initial determination of whether to
initiate an investigation but, rather, applied only after the
investigation had begun.197 The panel, focusing particularly on the
“as soon as” language of Article 5.8, decided that the provision
implied that an investigation may be initiated only if the application
contains sufficient evidence of dumping and injury.198
While the panel agreed with Mexico’s arguments regarding Article
5.3, it did not accept Mexico’s argument that the Guatemalan
authorities had acted inappropriately by independently seeking
information to supplement the application.199 The panel made it
clear that the Antidumping Code does not contain a prohibition
against the initiation of an investigation in situations in which
sufficient evidence is not reasonably available to the applicant.200 It
said, “There is nothing in this Agreement to prevent an investigating
authority from seeking evidence and information on its own, that
would allow any gaps in the evidence set forth in the application to be
filled.”201
The panel also agreed with Guatemala with regard to the amount
of evidence and information required for a determination to
investigate allegations raised in an application.202 According to the
panel, the quantum and quality of the evidence required for the
Guatemalan initiation determination was less than that required for a
preliminary or final determination of dumping, injury or the causal
link.203
Nonetheless, contrary to Guatemala’s arguments, the panel made
clear that the substantive provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of the
Antidumping Code were relevant to the initiation determination
195. Id. (offering an extreme example to prove the point).
196. Id. para. 7.59.
197. See id. para. 4.197.
198. See id. para. 7.59.
199. See id. para. 7.53.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See id. para. 7.57.
203. See id. (citing Softwood Lumber for the proposition that evidence might be insufficient
for a preliminary or final determination but sufficient for an initiation determination).

insofar as they set out the elements of a calculation of dumping and
injury respectively.204 For example, with respect to evidence of
dumping, the panel was clear that “an investigating authority may not
ignore the provisions of Article 2 of the [Antidumping Code].”205
According to the panel:
Article 5.2 of the Agreement requires an application to include
evidence of “dumping” and Article 5.3 requires a determination
that there is “sufficient” evidence to justify initiation. Article 2 of
the [Antidumping Code] sets forth the technical elements of a
calculation of dumping . . . . In our view, the reference in Article
5.2 to “dumping” must be read as a reference to dumping as it is
206
defined in Article 2.

With regard to the elements of dumping and injury, the panel
made the observation that, while there were higher standards for
assessing the evidence in a preliminary or final determination than
the determination to initiate an investigation, the subject matter or
type of evidence was the same.207
The panel stated that, because Mexico was claiming threat of
injury, its application should have included evidence of threat of
material injury as set out in Article 3.7.208 To find otherwise would be
inconsistent with the text, as well as with the object and purpose of
Article 5.2.209 According to the panel:
We cannot see how, in the absence of information pertaining to
[the factors set forth in Article 3.7], an unbiased and objective
investigating authority could properly determine that there is
sufficient evidence of threat of material injury to justify initiation in
210
a case in which threat of material injury is alleged.

As mentioned above, the panel ultimately concluded that there was
insufficient evidence in the application regarding dumping, injury
and causation to substantiate the initiation of an investigation.
Specifically, the Ministry did not meet the obligation inherent in
Article 2.4 to make a fair comparison in presenting evidence of

204. See id. paras. 7.64 (discussing dumping determination), 7.76 (discussing injury
determination).
205. See id. para. 7.64.
206. Id.
207. See id. paras. 7.67 (discussing dumping determination), 7.77 (discussing injury
determination).
208. See id. para. 7.76.
209. See id. para. 7.75.
210. Id. para. 7.77. The panel reached this conclusion despite the fact that Article 3.7 is not
expressly referenced in Article 5.2. See id. para. 7.76. Mexico had argued that Article 3.7 was
not applicable to the decision to initiate because Article 5.2 references Articles 3.2 and 3.4 but
not Article 3.7. See id. para. 7.58.

dumping.211
The application compared transactions involving
significantly different volumes and occurring at different levels of
trade,212 and it did so without even acknowledging the necessity of
making adjustments.213 There was also insufficient evidence of
material injury. The panel found that Guatemala had offered
unsubstantiated statements, rather than evidence, of the threat of
material injury that did not allow for the objective evaluation of
accuracy and adequacy required by Article 5.3.214
This was
particularly disturbing to the panel because much of the relevant
evidence was in the possession of the applicant and no one else.215 In
response to the suggestion that some of the information was withheld
because of its sensitivity, the panel pointed out that both the
Antidumping Code and Guatemalan law provide for the confidential
treatment of such information.216 Finally, the Ministry could not
possibly have correctly determined that there was sufficient evidence
of causation when there was not sufficient evidence of dumping or
injury.217
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Current State of Antidumping Measures and Evaluation of a
Threshold Evidentiary Requirement
Currently, many countries use antidumping measures as
protectionist weapons.218 When country x’s domestic market is unable
to keep up with foreign competition, companies from that market
may petition their government, which is then under considerable
political pressure to launch an antidumping investigation.219 These
211. See id. para. 7.64 & n.7.
212. See id. para. 7.62.
213. See id. para. 7.64.
214. See id. para. 7.71.
215. See id. para. 7.70.
216. See id. para. 7.71.
217. See id. para. 7.78.
218. See Bhala, supra note 18, at 5 (describing antidumping law as a weapon for
“protectionists seeking undeserved protection from competitive imports”); Corr, supra note 1,
at 53 (predicting that “antidumping law will become the weapon of choice for import
protection” as industries become exposed to new levels of international competition and turn
to “the most viable basis for imposing or preserving protective duties”); see also Finger, supra
note 60, at 34 (“Antidumping regulation was created by removing from antitrust law the checks
and balances that constrain antitrust law policy to disciplining only competitive practices that
compromise society’s overall interests.”).
219. See Finger, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing the industry pressure on governments to
launch antidumping investigations). A domestic company will often systematically file petitions
that target each of the imported products within a particular industry. See id. at 3. If a
petitioner does not convince its government to initiate an investigation based on the

investigations are invasive (often as invasive as the investigating
country can possibly make them), and their scope and length force
the company under investigation to divert its attention from
competing in the market, perhaps causing it to lose its competitive
edge.220 Antidumping investigations also cause other competing
companies to expect such an experience if investigated, thus
diverting their attention from production and marketing.221
Country x will usually find the presence of dumping, injury and
causation, at which time it will levy a duty that further cripples the
targeted company.222 Once country x has brought a sufficient
number of investigations, the targeted companies, as well as other
foreign companies that have not yet been investigated, may begin to
reconsider doing business in country x.223 Business becomes an
economic gamble because of the price an investigation exacts.224 The
alternative for companies is to redirect their export trade to a country
whose government is less willing than country x to resort to
antidumping investigations as a means to protect its domestic market
from healthy and fair competition.225 This is, not coincidentally, the
result that the petitioners most often intend to produce by initiating
investigations.226
petitioner’s first complaint, a petitioner often will resubmit the complaint, slightly modifying
the definition of the threatened or injured industry, until the domestic government is
convinced that there has been an injury to the domestic industry. See J. Michael Finger, Lessons
for the Case Studies: Conclusions, in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS, supra note 9, at 35, 39-40
[hereinafter Finger, Conclusions] (using the Colombian cut flower industry as an example).
220. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of investigations on
targeted countries).
221. See Corr, supra note 1, at 54 (stating that “the mere filing of an antidumping
complaint” often has “a marked chilling effect on competition” and often places exporters and
importers at a severe disadvantage).
222. See id. (citing a “conviction rate” of over 90% in the U.S. between 1980-1997); Finger,
supra note 9, at 3, 5 (describing the pressure on the exporter to accept a restraint agreement to
avoid “the formal antidumping or countervailing duty order that is just around the
administrative corner”).
223. See McGee, supra note 46, at 500-01 (explaining how the Taiwanese sweater
manufacturers are having difficulty competing in the U.S. market due to U.S. antidumping
laws); id. at 535 (noting that one harmful effect of U.S. antidumping law is that foreign
producers choose not to enter the U.S. market because of the high risk of being hit with an
investigation); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the potential effect on
other foreign companies).
224. See Finger & Murray, supra note 130, at 247 (discussing the uncertainty that responding
to a petition generates regarding the profitability of continuing efforts to export in the
particular market); McGee, supra note 46, at 535 (arguing that both foreign suppliers and
domestic importers will have to take the potential costs of an antidumping investigation into
consideration, and noting that domestic importers will hesitate to do business with foreign
producers because the liabilities of an investigation might transfer to them).
225. See McGee, supra note 46, at 535.
226. See Yeomin Yoon, The Korean Chip Dumping Controversy: Are they Accused of Violating an
Unjust Law?, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 247, 259 (1994) (noting that companies are
abusing antidumping laws by filing actions for the purpose of battering the foreign

Antidumping measures stifle competition and deter trade and
investment.227 They harm imports that are both fairly and unfairly
priced.228 They are inconsistent with antitrust laws.229 Perhaps most
importantly, they are bad for the domestic consumer.230
In the United States, the fact that the ITA launches investigations
on nearly all of the petitions that U.S. companies file suggests the low
level of scrutiny currently attached to the amount of evidence
required to initiate a petition.231 The frequency of both antidumping
competition’s ability to compete); cf. J. Michael Finger, Preface to ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT
WORKS, supra note 9, at vii, viii (“Dumping is the rhetoric justifying action against imports; it is
not the criterion that determines when such action will or will not be taken. When the politics
of the matter compel action against imports, the legal definition of dumping can be stretched
to accommodate it.”).
227. See Christopher M. Barbuto, Toward Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An
International Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047, 2050 (1994) (noting
the criticisms that American antidumping laws deny consumers access to competitively-priced
goods and are biased against foreign companies in a manner that is counter to free trade
principles). According to one commentator, “Complaining about the unfairness of foreigners
has become the most popular way for an industry seeking protection from imports to make its
case to its government.” Finger, supra note 9, at 3. Not only does Finger believe antidumping
measures are anticompetitive in policy, but he argues that they actually provoke a targeted
company to engage in anticompetitive practices, such as formal price coordination, in order to
avoid becoming the target of an investigation. See Finger, Conclusions, supra note 219, at 53
(summarizing industry studies).
228. See Richard Boltuck et al., The Economic Implications of the Administration of the U.S. Unfair
Trade Laws, in DOWN IN THE DUMPS, supra note 9, at 179 (noting that the application of
dumping laws in particular are “a modified escape clause that provides potential relief from all
imports”); Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade System Despite
U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 967, 992 n.131 (1996) (describing the U.S.
antidumping regulations as “so virulent that they penalize fairly priced imports as well as those
at unfair prices”).
229. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments and for
Private Business: A “Trade Law Approach” for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 545, 575 (1996) (“As a means to protect import-competing industries against
predatory pricing by foreign exporters, antidumping laws are inconsistent with antitrust laws
(e.g., in the EC and United States) and go far beyond what might be necessary.”); A. Paul
Victor, Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies be Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
339, 339 (1983) (asserting that antidumping measures are at odds with antitrust theory).
230. Antidumping measures protect “producers at the expense of consumers, which results
in higher prices, lower quality products, less consumer choice and a general lowering of the
standard of living for the vast majority of people.” McGee, supra note 46, at 491. Some even
argue that antidumping measures destroy jobs by forcing the U.S.-based affiliates of foreign
companies to relocate to other countries and by shutting down U.S. companies that rely on
foreign components to produce their products. See id.
231. See id. at 547. According to a Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) study of the
1986-1989 period, 96% of the petitions resulted in investigations. See id. (citation omitted).
According to McGee, “The Commerce Department [ITA] is very sensitive to any allegations
made by a domestic company or industry, regardless of the truth or quality of
information . . . . All it takes is a letter from a company that might stand to be harmed by a
foreign competitor.” Id. at 551; see also Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the
Context of the World Trade System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097, 1116 (1995) (claiming that there are
“inherent biases against importation in the structure of antidumping law as shown in such areas
as . . . standing to bring petition”). But see David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to
International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 11 (1995) (“The U.S.
dumping law is detailed and specific, with strict statutory time limits, reducing--but not

investigations and findings of dumping in the United States has
caused the antidumping system to be widely criticized “as a club [that
domestic companies use] to batter the competition.”232 Some critics
go further and accuse the United States of engaging in behavior that
is incompatible with the GATT/WTO.233
B. The Threshold for Initiation of an Antidumping Investigation Should Be
Higher
The sufficiency of evidence threshold has a direct and powerful
effect on the number of investigations that are filed and initiated. A
higher threshold would serve as a sieve, allowing through authentic
cases of predatory pricing and truly unfair trade while blocking cases
in which antidumping is being used for protectionist purposes.234 As
such, any attempt to weed out frivolous, pretextual petitions should
focus on the threshold for initiation.235
Individual members of the WTO currently have substantial
flexibility in setting their own standards for initiation requirements.236
eliminating--the discretion available to the administering authorities.”); Stewart, supra note 9, at
289 (“[D]omestic producers find that a few interpretations of U.S. law by the Department of
Commerce bias the results in favor of foreign respondents.”).
232. McGee, supra note 46, at 546 (accusing the system of having rules that are “so biased
that nearly all the foreign companies that were investigated for dumping between 1980 and
1989 were found guilty”); see also id. at 547 (noting that the company submitting the petition
does not pay for the investigation but “stands to gain if a competitor can either be bloodied by
the Commerce Department [ITA] and forced to raise its prices, or exits the U.S. market
altogether, thus reducing the competition, and the need to keep prices low”). But see Josephs,
supra note 122, at 73 (defending the U.S. laws as “fair, impartial and transparent” in comparison
to the administration of antidumping laws in other countries).
233. See Hurabiell, supra note 47, at 567-68 (stating that U.S. protectionist trade policies are
at odds with a system of free trade and, specifically, the GATT). The objective of the GATT,
after all, is to constrain governments from imposing or enforcing measures that restrain or
distort international trade. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 290.
234. Repealing the antidumping measures might actually best resolve the problem, but it is
a politically impossible solution. See Finger, Conclusions, supra note 219, at 57-58 (suggesting
options including the repeal and reform of the existing antidumping laws).
235. Other suggestions for improving the initiation of antidumping investigations, not
related to an evidentiary threshold requirement, include adding a public interest clause and
replacing the private interest injury test with a national economic interest test. See id. at 60-74;
see also RAINER M. BIERWAGEN, GATT ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN ANTIDUMPING
LAWS 169 (Studies in Transatlantic Economic Law No. 7, 1990) (recommending the following
three-step approach toward abandoning antidumping: (1) conforming existing trade relief
measures with the letter and spirit of the GATT, (2) increasing substantive and procedural
obstacles to raise thresholds for trade relief, and (3) gradually replacing antidumping
legislation with domestic antitrust and competition law); Matsushita, supra note 231, at 1116
(advocating the incorporation of principles of competition law to offset the abuses of
antidumping legislation); Messerlin, supra note 6, at 57-61 (detailing how a “national domestic
interest” clause on material injury would mean that neither a country nor the WTO would take
antidumping measures when such measures are not in the best interest of that country or the
WTO). But see Stewart, supra note 9, at 288 (arguing that U.S. antidumping laws are necessary
and need strengthening).
236. As discussed above, the WTO Antidumping Code contains explicit requirements with

The GATT traditionally avoided the issue of a threshold requirement,
evaluating it in very few instances in relation to the considerable
controversy surrounding it. The Portland Cement panel report raises
the possibility that the WTO will change this policy.237
C. The Effect of the Portland Cement Panel Report on the Threshold for
Initiation of an Investigation
In the Portland Cement panel report, the WTO undeniably took the
strongest stance that it or the GATT has taken to date with regard to
insisting that applications meet a minimum threshold before a
national authority can initiate an antidumping investigation.
Whereas the antidumping law generally appears to be tipped in favor
of the investigating country and applicant company or industry, the
panel evened the field to some degree by applying the balancing test
proposed for countervailing duty cases in the Softwood Lumber panel
report; this test balances the interests of the exporting, allegedly
dumping country and those of the importing, investigating country.238
The panel concluded that the Guatemalan authorities wrongly
initiated an investigation because the application in question did not
provide sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causation.239 As
mentioned above, this report is a strong statement for the WTO in
this area of trade. In the process of providing interpretations of the
elements that a national authority must consider in making its
initiation determination, the panel raised the threshold that an
application must meet. The report will have perhaps its most
significant impact as a result of its interpretation of Article 5.3 of the
Antidumping Code; the panel’s determination that Article 5.3
contains requirements distinct from those in Article 5.2 clearly
increases the burden on both the applicant and the national
authority contemplating investigation.240 The fact that the panel
granted the national authority the right to act independently to
supplement the application does not affect the threshold that an
application must meet. The panel also noticeably raised the
regard to standing. Conversely, the requirements regarding the evidentiary threshold are vague
and have not been tested except in the Portland Cement matter.
237. Finger, however, offers a metaphor that would suggest that the policy of avoidance will
continue. He says, “Antidumping is the fox put in charge of the henhouse: trade restrictions
certified by GATT. The fox is clever enough not only to eat the hens but also to convince the
farmer that that is the way things ought to be.” Finger, supra note 60, at 34.
238. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing Softwood Lumber’s adoption of the
balancing test).
239. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing panel’s holding).
240. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (discussing panel’s differentiation
between the requirements of Articles 5.2 and 5.3).

requirements by ruling that Articles 2 and 3, which set out the
elements of dumping and injury, are relevant to the initial
investigation determination as well as the preliminary and final
determinations.241 Finally, the panel’s application of the rules to the
case at hand was demonstrative; the panel stood fast in requiring that
the national authorities present evidence of dumping in terms that
can be compared and in not allowing mere statements to take the
place of evidence when assessing a case for the existence of injury.242
As a result of the Appellate Body report, the impact of the panel
report has yet to be determined. Mexico may begin the DSU process
again. The panel in that case—or any other case—will have the
opportunity to rely on the analysis and conclusions of the Portland
Cement panel report. This is, in effect, no different from the panel
report being approved by the Appellate Body.
The Portland Cement panel report was the WTO’s first move toward
clarifying the threshold for the initiation of antidumping
investigations. Through its analysis, the panel sent a message that the
threshold requirements are more than a formality. It appeared to
establish a framework through which applications, and decisions to
initiate investigations, should be examined.
For the reasons
discussed above, it remains to be seen whether future panels will use
that framework.
D. The WTO Should Codify a Threshold Requirement for the Initiation of
Antidumping Investigations in Precise Language that Leaves Little Room for
Interpretation by Individual Countries
The WTO should decide on a higher initiation requirement and
codify it in the Antidumping Code. The evaluation of sufficient
evidence should be a required part of the preliminary determination.
If investigators conclude that the petitioner does not present
sufficient evidence to support a petition, the investigation should
terminate prior to the preliminary determination of dumping, injury
and causation.243
The WTO should codify the results of the Portland Cement panel
241. See supra notes 204-06 (discussing the panel’s holding regarding relevance of Arts. 2
and 3 to initiation determination).
242. See supra notes 208-17 (discussing panel’s application of its ruling to Guatemala’s
investigation).
243. Within the United States, the evaluation of standing should be the responsibility of
both the ITA and the ITC, and should be evaluated by both in a step prior to the ITC’s
preliminary injury determination. But see Cass & Narkin, supra note 12, at 229-32 (citing the
possibility of conflict, division of authority and sequence of decisions as among the difficulties
existing with regard to the issue of which agency has authority to decide standing matters).

report. Until it does so, WTO members will not be able to take full
advantage of the clarifications that the panel made to the threshold
requirements. In particular, the WTO should codify the balancing
test discussed in the countervailing duty context in Softwood Lumber
and adopted by the panel in Portland Cement. The test would require
the WTO to weigh the interest of the domestic industry in securing
the initiation of an investigation based on a deserving claim against
the interest of the exporting country in avoiding the burden of an
investigation initiated on a petition that is without merit. The WTO
should also require the national authorities to evaluate each petition
for accuracy and adequacy of evidence, and it should require the
petitioner to base its allegations of dumping and injury on the
criteria of Articles 2 and 3 of the Antidumping Code.
The WTO should implement several other changes to the initiation
procedures as well. First, the WTO should raise the standard by
defining what “reasonably available to [the petitioner]” means with
respect to information. Second, the WTO should require that the
petitioner provide an explanation for the absence of any missing
information.244 Third, the WTO should implement a public/national
interest analysis, either at the initial stage of investigation or following
the final determinations as to injury and dumping.245
Not only would WTO obligations compel Member states to
implement such changes in their national laws, but the WTO’s
dispute resolution regime would also incite Member states to apply
the standard.246 This system is far stronger than the one that existed
under GATT.247 The prospect of facing retaliatory measures will
encourage Member countries to comply with their obligations under
the WTO.248 Furthermore, countries will continue to see that the
effectiveness of the WTO system is contingent upon compliance.249
Countries that frequently resort to the WTO’s dispute settlement
244. This policy was suggested by the United States in its submission in the Portland Cement
matter. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing Portland Cement).
245. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (stating that the ITA does not currently
consider such a standard).
246. See supra Part I.D (discussing the more binding nature of the WTO dispute resolution
system); see also SCHOTT, supra note 31, at 14 (stating that the Uruguay Round “fortified the
institutional charter of the GATT by establishing a new [WTO] to consolidate the results of
previous trade negotiations under a common framework . . . .”).
247. See Steele, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that dispute settlement under the WTO could be
superior to that under the GATT); see also supra Part I.D (discussing strengths of new dispute
settlement system).
248. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of this process.
249. It is clear that “trading rules have little value unless they can be enforced.” JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, WTO 2000: SETTING THE COURSE FOR WORLD TRADE 6 (1996) (claiming that the
effectiveness of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism could “make or break” the success of
the WTO).

mechanism, such as the United States, will have an even greater
incentive to strengthen the WTO system, and thus should be more
willing to comply.250
The reality of the situation, however, is that Members are not likely
to agree to a higher initiation threshold.251 Based on the controversy
that has historically surrounded this issue, the great divergence in
views, and political factors influencing countries’ positions, it is
arguable whether the Members are capable of even negotiating a
more precise definition of the current standard.252 Great diplomacy
on the part of powerful members such as the United States and the
European Union certainly would be necessary.253 The stance that the
United States took in the Portland Cement case, in which it argued for
a more defined standard that would bar unmeritorious petitions,
suggests a possible auspicious shift in U.S. policy on the matter.254
In sum, decisions of the WTO dispute settlement panels and the
Appellate Body may be the most practical method of effecting change
in the threshold for initiation. In the Portland Cement dispute, the
panel took advantage of the “clean slate” that it faced on the
initiation issue, as well as the new and improved dispute settlement
mechanism, and squarely took on the issue of an evidentiary burden.
The panel ruled strongly in favor of having a meaningful threshold
for investigations. Hopefully, future panels will see the wisdom in
250. See id. at 7 (stating that because the DSU has assisted the United States to achieve
favorable resolutions of harmful foreign trade practices by Korea and Japan, the United States
has been careful to comply with DSU rulings).
251. An amendment to the Antidumping Code requires agreement by two-thirds of the
WTO’s members. See WTO Agreement, supra note 37, arts. X.1-X.4.
252. See SCHOTT, supra note 31, at 34 (“As a practical matter, attempts to amend the WTO
antidumping rules to remedy this important problem are unlikely to bear fruit. Few countries
want to reopen the antidumping text after the harsh experience of the Uruguay Round
negotiations.”); Hindley, supra note 46, at 26 (claiming that political considerations at either
the national or supranational (WTO) level could block reform); Petersmann, supra note 229, at
578-79 (citing political reasons such as the power of the domestic import-competing industries
for the unlikelihood of reform); id. at 578 (“The experience with the 1979 GATT Antidumping
Code and the 1994 WTO Antidumping Code suggest that reforms of international antidumping
rules through international negotiations in GATT and the WTO among self-interested
antidumping bureaucracies may produce only few procedural improvements.”).
253. Petersmann supports this notion, writing:
Reform of antidumping rules will not be politically possible without the strong support
from export industries in the EC and the United States. In order to build up such
support, other trading countries may have to use “carrots” (e.g., liberalization of
governmental market access barriers and enforcement of competition rules against
private market access barriers to prevent market segmentation as one precondition for
dumping) as well as “sticks” (e.g., reciprocal use of antidumping laws against EC and
U.S. exporters).
Petersmann, supra note 229, at 579.
254. But see id. at 578 (acknowledging that the main importing countries, such as the United
States and the EC, will not be persuaded to support reform as long as their exporting
competitors continue to be the targets of anticompetitive investigations).

following this tradition, and the WTO dispute resolution system will
act as a vehicle for reform.
CONCLUSION
The WTO has obligations to the international community. While it
must be flexible out of political necessity, it also must set standards
for international trade. It needs to establish a clear requirement of
an evidentiary threshold in antidumping investigations.
The
standard must be one by which all countries can, and will, abide. The
organization must realize its limitations and accept that if it pushes its
members too far, they will not comply and the organization will lose
all credibility. Conversely, it must not shrink from its responsibility to
promote fair and free trade, or the WTO will risk becoming
meaningless. Antidumping measures may have met this balance in
the past, but they no longer do; the initiation threshold must now be
set clearly, and at a sufficiently high level, in order to accomplish the
same goals.

